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Armenian Velvet Revolution
"Nikol Pashinyan was right. I was wrong …. The street movement is against my tenure. I
am fulfilling your demand".1 Those were the last words Serzh Sargsyan publicly said before
giving up his power after 8 years of presidency and 6 days of premiership.
It was Monday, April 23, 2018. I was woken up at 8 am by a phone call. It was Nelly, my
childhood best friend from Armenia. I was shocked and worried when saw her name popping
up on my phone screen as, when I am in the US, she never calls me without prior arrangements,
unless it is an emergency. I picked up the phone immediately and the first words I heard were:
“Stella, we won! He resigned. We won!”. While I realized right away that she was talking about
the Velvet Revolution, I could not believe it. Only a day prior, on April 22, Pashinyan and
Sargsyan met to ‘negotiate’ in front of tens of journalists -- talks that ended in a matter of
minutes with Sargsyan storming out of the room saying: “You’ve learned nothing from March 1;
and if you don’t change your tone and come to the legal field, you’ll bear full responsibility [for
the consequences]. The choice is yours” (on March 1, 2008, 10 people were killed when police
violently dispersed an opposition campsite in the Freedom Square, Yerevan, Armenia, after
2008 presidential elections).2 After the meeting, Pashinyan was arrested. How, in just a matter
of hours after those failed ‘negotiations,’ did Sargsyan resign without any attempt to use
violence towards the protestors?

1
2

Roth, Andrew. 2018. Shock as Armenia's prime minister steps down after 11 days of protests. The Guardian
Epress.am. 2018. Serzh Sargsyan Threatens Pashinyan With March 1 to Make Him Stop Fighting
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Armenians were euphoric -- everyone was full of hope. The initial joy and satisfaction
from the victory was truly breathtaking. I went back to Armenia in May 2018, only a few weeks
after Serzh Sargsyan’s resignation. My own overexcited mind might have been playing tricks
with me, but the Armenian air felt lighter, people were smiling more and seemed happier.
Every single Armenian I talked to did believe that we were living at a turning point in Armenian
history. It seemed like the ‘dark days’ of Armenia were left behind. People trusted Nikol
Pashinyan.
International polling in October 2018 concluded that 82 percent of Armenians were in
support of Pashinyan’s performance, more than 80 percent of Armenians were optimistic about
the country’s future, and 72 percent felt they could directly influence decisions made by the
government.3 Nonetheless, it seems like Pashinyan’s support has been declining throughout his
two years in the office. According to the International Republican Institute (IRI), in October
2018, 41 percent of Armenians viewed the 2018 change of the government “very positively”,
however that number dropped to 28 percent in May 2019.4 The change of attitude that is even
more concerning is that while only three percent of respondents viewed the change of the
government “very negatively” in October 2018, in May 2019 the number rose to ten percent.5
Armenia’s geopolitical situation is highly complicated -- it is in unfavorable relations with
two out of four bordering countries, the Nagorno Karabakh conflict is an ongoing worry as well
as Russia’s grip on Armenia constrains the country from forming new political alliances.
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Jennings, Ray Salvatore. 2019. Upgrading U.S. Support for Armenia’s Postrevolution Reforms. Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace
4
Kucera, Joshua. 2019. Poll shows high, but declining, support for Armenian government. Eurasianet.org
5
Ibid.
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Armenia does not have a free will when it comes to making decisions -- the abovementioned
conditions regularly dictate the next steps that the Armenian government has to undertake.
The focus of this thesis is the Velvet Revolution that took place in April 2018. This is a
rather new political development, hence one should be careful when analyzing it, as Nikol
Pashinyan’s government is relatively new and they were inherited with highly corrupt, povertyridden, oligarchic post-Soviet state. When Pashinyan began his march from Gyumri to Yerevan
on March 31, 2018, no one truly had high expectations regarding the outcome of it. Every
Armenian, during their lifetime, has seen many political activists that went on hunger strikes,
organized seat-ins and tent cities, blocked streets, etc., however, none of those actions had
successful outcomes. It is still mind-blowing, how, despite all odds, the Velvet Revolution had a
successful outcome that led to a new era in Armenian history.
This thesis explores the impacts of the Velvet Revolution on Armenia and Armenians as
the change of the government does not necessarily guarantee positive outcomes for the
country and its citizens. The question this thesis will strive to answer is: To what extent did
Armenia’s domestic issues and foreign relations improve after the Velvet Revolution? Why the
Velvet Revolution emerged and was it truly successful?
It is rather hard to respond to the proposed questions as there is no one correct answer.
In order to evaluate the level of success that Pashinyan’s cabinet achieved one needs to explore
what were the conditions before the Velvet Revolution and how they changed after it.
Additionally, to understand how this movement came to be, it is essential to explore the factors
that led to the emergence of the Velvet Revolution. The short answer to the proposed question

6

is that certain aspects of domestic and foreign relations did improve, however, it is evident that
Pashinyan was not able to carry out all his promises yet. Additionally, May 8, 2020, marks only
the second anniversary of Pashinyan’s governance, which is a rather short time period from a
political perspective.
Chapter 1 explores the notion of Color Revolutions and establishes the framework in
which Color Revolutions will be analyzed. This chapter consists of three parts: the first part
discusses what Color Revolutions are and how one might try to understand them. A framework
is established for understanding the use of phrases like ‘success cases’ and ‘failed cases’ of
Color Revolutions and what those entail. The second part of the chapter discusses similarities
that have been spotted between all the cases of Color Revolutions. Three similarities that will
be explored are fraudulent elections, youth movements, and Western influence. Lastly, eight
cases of Color Revolutions are presented, after which the case of the Velvet Revolution is
discussed. This chapter will provide the reader with necessary background information for
understanding Color Revolutions and some of their distinct characteristics.
Chapter 2 introduces the reader to the external factors that led Armenia and Armenians
towards the Velvet Revolution. The three main focuses of this Chapter are Democratic Diffusion
and Linkage/Leverage, the role of the West and Western NGOs, and the role of Russia when it
comes to Armenia’s decision-making process. Democratic Diffusion and Linkage/Leverage
create a theoretical framework through which one can understand how democracy and
democratic values, ideals, policies, etc. spread or what kind of obstacles can prevent those from
spreading. When it comes to the West, it is proven that it usually has a very strong influence on
the outcome of Color Revolutions. What was the West’s approach to the Velvet Revolution?
7

The most important external factor for Armenia is Russia as Armenia’s dependency on Russia is
almost alarming. Why Russia did not stop the Velvet Revolution from happening? Why Putin
allowed Serzh Sargsyan to step down?
Chapter 3 focuses on the domestic problems that Armenia faced, which ultimately led
the country towards the Velvet Revolution. While Armenia faces many domestic problems -anything from poverty and unemployment to distrust in the government -- this chapter focuses
on oligarchy, poor living conditions, electoral fraud, and dissatisfied youth. Those four specific
aspects were chosen as electoral fraud and dissatisfied youth are central issues to any Color
Revolution, while an oligarchy and poor living conditions culminate in themselves many of the
issues that citizens of Armenia are faced with.
Chapter 4 explores what happened in Armenia after the Velvet Revolution. This chapter
takes an extensive look into the power struggle that followed the Velvet Revolution, how
Armenia’s foreign relations changed under Pashinyan’s government, and what domestic
improvements were implemented by Pashinyan. Some of the trials discussed in this chapter are
ongoing, and several events examined happened only a few weeks ago, hence one can only
analyze what happened and predict possible outcomes.
Armenia is an extremely interesting but complicated case study to examine as there are
several dilemmas one is faced with when looking into it. For example, historically, Armenia
always had extremely close ties with Russia which interfered with the creation of better
relations with the European Union. Around thirty year-long conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan due to Nagorno Karabakh is another dispute that seems like is impossible to solve.

8

Armenia’s deeply rooted traditions and oligarchic domination seem incompatible with having a
democratic and fair government. Will Nikol Pashinyan’s government be able to develop
Armenia and improve people’s lives despite all those complications that are on their way?
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Chapter 1: Exploring Color Revolutions
In the mid-2000s worldwide media coined the term Color Revolution to refer to the
widespread demonstrations and revolution attempts in Eastern Europe and Balkans. The term
itself is rather ambiguous -- it “is stronger in terms of imaginary and connotations than on
descriptive or analytical accuracy”6. I define Color Revolutions as nonviolent uprisings in postSoviet states that emerged after fraudulent elections.
There is no singular definition or agreement on which revolutions are considered Color
Revolutions and which are not: the classical understanding of the notion argues that resistance
movements in the post-Soviet countries and the Balkans are Color Revolutions, while others
expand the scope of the definition and include movements in the Middle East (including Arab
Spring) and a few Asian countries. It is also highly debated which revolution was the first Color
Revolution; some scholars like David Lane go as far back as Portugal’s “Revolution of the
Carnations” of April 1974, which was in fact a military coup rather than a Color Revolution.7
Others believe that the “Yellow Revolution” in the Philippines (February 1986) was the first
Color Revolution because it was the first non-violent uprising in the contemporary world.
However, most of the scholars that study Color Revolutions agree that the “Bulldozer
Revolution” of October 2000 in Yugoslavia marked the beginning of the Color Revolutions.8
Literature divides Color Revolutions into two groups – ‘successful cases’ and ‘failed
cases’. This distinction refers to the outcome of the revolution -- if the old government was
6

Mitchell, Lincoln. 2012. The Color Revolutions. Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press. Page 7
Lane, David. 2009. ‘Coloured Revolution’ as a Political Phenomenon. Journal of
Communist Studies and Transition Politics. Vol. 25 N2-3. Page 114
8
Gerlach, Julia. 2014. Color Revolutions in Eurasia. Springer Briefs in Political Science. Page 3
7
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replaced with the new one, the revolution was successful, if the existing government remained
in power, then the revolution was unsuccessful. This division does not consider the long-term
effects of the events. This project will explore eight different countries where Color Revolutions
took place. Those countries are Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), Armenia (2003/2004/2018),
Ukraine (2004/2005), Kyrgyzstan (2005), Azerbaijan (2005), Belarus (2006), and Russia
(2011/2012). According to the above-mentioned distinction, Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine,
Kyrgyzstan and Armenia (2018) are ‘successful cases’ of Color Revolutions (change of
government), while Armenia (2003/2004), Azerbaijan, Belarus and Russia are considered to be
‘failed cases’ (old government prevailed).

Bulldozer Revolution (Serbia)

2000

Successful

Rose Revolution (Georgia)

2003

Successful

Armenia

2003/2004, 2008

Failed

Orange Revolution (Ukraine)

2004/2005

Successful

Tulip Revolution (Kyrgyzstan)

2005

Successful

Azerbaijan

2005

Failed

Belarus

2006

Failed

Russia

2011/2012

Failed

Velvet Revolution (Armenia)

2018

Successful
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When one further explores ‘successful cases’ of Color Revolutions, it becomes evident
that terming those revolutions successful is rather unsuitable. The new government, for various
reasons, becomes unable to carry out its promises -- in some cases, the new government is not
as democratic as it was expected, in others’ corruption and nepotism remain prevalent. Marc
Morje Howard notes that the “civil society in these countries had been declared rather dead
than alive by most scholars”.9 Gerlach argues that the empirical evidence shows an endless
cycle of authoritarian regimes in countries where the Color Revolutions “succeeded”10 and that
revolutions were simply “setting of opportunity structures for ousting the leader, and forecasts
a never-ending sequence of hybrid regimes without explaining how the rather predictable cycle
could be terminated”.11
In the early 1990s, democratization was a general trend in Southeastern and Central
European countries. Nonetheless, for most of the post-Soviet countries this was not the case, as
many of them became less democratic during the same time period.12 Way and Levitsky,
however, do emphasize the fact that Southeastern and Central Europe have a rather
democratic past while some incorrectly assume that post-Soviet countries, historically, have
never been democratic.
Way and Levitsky connect democratization patterns to the Western leverage, which is
the “governments’ vulnerability to external pressure” and linkage to the West that is “the

9

Howard, Marc Morjé. 2003. The Weakness of Civil Society in Post-Communist Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press
10
Gerlach, Julia. 2014. Color Revolutions in Eurasia. Springer Briefs in Political Science. Page 31
11
Ibid.
12
Way, Lucan & Levitsky, Steven. 2007. Linkage Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide. East European Politics
and Societies. V. 21. Page 49
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density of a country’s economic, political, organizational, social, and communication ties to the
West”.13 Central/Southeastern Europe has always enjoyed “dense geographic, social, economic,
communication, and intergovernmental ties”14 with Western Europe, which has strengthened
democratic forces. On the other hand, post-Soviet states, even after the collapse of the USSR,
preserved strong ties with the Kremlin, which allowed Russia to retain its influence on those
countries. Simply put, the West is associated with democratic change, while regional powers
like Russia and China are associated with promoting and pushing towards authoritarian
stability. While Western powers and Non-Governmental Organizations occasionally try to
influence and ‘democratize’ post-Soviet states, Russian influence remains strong, which
discourages the West from providing more support to those countries.15 The strong ties to
Russia are not always a choice made by those countries: those countries’ linkages and leverages
to Russia are simply too strong and it is extremely difficult to break that pattern. In the case of
Armenia, Russia is Armenia’s most powerful ally, which results in a huge power imbalance in
the relationship between the two states.

Is it a Color Revolution?
One might ask, what similar traits all those Color Revolutions share? One of the first
similarities that stands out when researching Color Revolutions is the fact that all of them
emerged after major fraudulent elections. When the electoral fraud is extremely obvious,
people start to believe that if it did not occur, election results would have led to a different

13

Ibid. Page 50
Ibid. Page 55
15
Ibid.
14
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outcome -- having another president or another political party would have gained a
parliamentary majority. Way and Levitsky mention that election vote fraud can be very severe
and “may deprive the opposition of up to 10 percent of the actual vote”.16 Major electoral
frauds, however, increase the chance of large-scale protests as according to Tucker: “major
electoral fraud provides an obvious focal point for action”.17 The scale of the protests allows
people not to worry about individual punishments but rather hope for and focus on a positive
outcome. Beachain and Polese additionally note that historically, elections have been a rather
advantageous time to demonstrate with a hope to achieve a change, as they provide “a rare
opportunity to mobilize and demonstrate with relative impunity, as international observers are
usually present”18.
Joshua Tucker19 has his own explanation of why Color Revolutions emerge after
fraudulent elections. When people have strong grievances against the government, addressing
them can have high costs and low chances of success. Hence, citizens decide not to move
forward with addressing those grievances. Electoral fraud, however, changes those calculations
drastically and encourages citizens to protest, because if electoral fraud occurred, challenging it
can mean a complete change of the government. Therefore, the outcome of protests, if
successful, can be very valuable. Regime change is not an easy outcome to achieve -- in some of

16

Ibid.
Tucker, Joshua. 2007. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist
Colored Revolutions. Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 5, No. 3. Page 541
18
Beacháin, Donnacha & Polese, Abel. 2010. The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and
Failures. London&New York: Routledge. Page 7
19
Tucker, Joshua. 2007. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored
Revolutions. Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 5, No. 3. Pages 535-551
17
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these countries, the ruling elite was in power for decades, and “elections have become events
designed simply to legitimize the existing governments rather than to choose leaders”20.
Another similarity that all Color Revolutions have is the important role that the Youth
Movements played in a change-making process. Students usually become core activists of the
movement -- this is the case for every Color Revolution, however, generally speaking, youth
leads the majority of protests in the world.21 Especially in successful cases of Color Revolutions,
youth movements were able to become large in scale: “Otpor [in Yugoslavia] developed an
extensive non-hierarchical network of activists in the regions. By the time of Presidential
election, the social movement had more than 70,000 members in 130 branches across the
country”.22 Pora in Ukraine had more than 35,000 regular members, while Kmara in Georgia
had around 3000 members at the peak of the group’s activity, and Zubr in Belarus established
its presence in 152 towns.23 In Azerbaijan, which presents a failed case of Color Revolution,
different youth groups attracted around 100 participants each and mainly operated in the
capital city of Baku.24 Former Otpor activist said: “You cannot defeat the government by
imposing sanctions on it or outspending it. But you can accomplish it by gaining numbers”.25
While numbers are important, the choice of tactics used by the youth organizations is
critical as tactical innovation can catch authorities off guard and have a stronger impact than

20

Way, Lucan & Levitsky, Steven. 2007. Linkage Leverage, and the Post-Communist Divide. East European Politics
and Societies 21. Page 49
21
Nikolayenko, Olena. 2009. Youth Movements in Post-Communist Societies: A Model of Nonviolent Resistance
(Working Paper). Center on Democracy, Development, and The Rule of Law Freeman Spogli Institute for
International Studies. Page 4
22
Ibid. Page 14
23
Ibid. Page 12
24
Ibid. Page 13
25
Ibid. Page 14
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familiar protest tactics.26 For example, Otpor came up with two campaigns: “campaign Gotov
Je! (He’s Finished) to expose weaknesses of the incumbent government and campaign Vreme
Je! (It’s Time) to boost voter turnout”.27 Former Otpor activist mentioned: “We realized that we
shouldn’t fight against the consequences of Milosevic’s regime. We had to fight against the
source of all the problems – Milosevic himself. We decided that we would put all the blame on
Milosevic”.28 Youth movements that originated after Otpor took inspiration from them and
used their tactics. For Kmara, Otpor was the most recent example of non-violent resistance and
they incorporated many of Otpor’s tactics. However, unlike Otpor, they did not focus on two
campaigns simultaneously because they did not have enough time for that. After some time,
governments become familiar with the tactics that youth movements use, hence those
movements need to become increasingly creative to be able to surprise the regime with
something unexpected.
The third similarity between cases of Color Revolutions is the involvement of the West
and Western NGOs. In the cases of Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine, “ties to the West and prodemocracy assistance via endorsements, training and funding of the opposition, as well as
international media coverage all played a crucial role”.29 Gerlach argues that while positive
outcomes might have occurred even without Western influence, the “scale, vigor, and
outcome” would have not been the same.30 American-sponsored NGOs, and in particular
George Soros and his Open Society Foundations, are regularly mentioned when discussing Color

26

Ibid. Page 7
Ibid. Page 14
28
Ibid.
29
Gerlach, Julia. 2014. “Color Revolutions in Eurasia”. Springer Briefs in Political Science. Page 16
30
Ibid.
27
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Revolutions. Nezavisimaya Gazeta (Russian newspaper) noted, "Russian political analysts are
fond of referring to divisions of the Soros Foundation and Carnegie Center that 'force
democracy' all over the world”.31 In Russia, it was a widespread idea that due to Pora being
modeled on Serbia's Otpor and Georgia's Kmara, the Orange Revolution was imported from the
United States through Serbia and Georgia.32 The Western sponsors either outright finance
revolutions or offer their support to youth movements by mentoring them and teaching
revolutionary tactics. Governments that were prone to undergoing Color Revolutions, started
implementing harsh laws towards Western NGOs. The new NGO law in Russia (December 2005)
significantly impeded the activities of civil society and restricted funding from abroad, while
justifying those actions with the need to prevent the possibility of a Ukraine-style electoral
revolution in Russia.33

Case Studies
This thesis considers the Bulldozer Revolution in Serbia (2000) as the first case of the
Color Revolution in the post-Soviet space. Many more revolutions followed the Bulldozer
Revolution; however, the main ones that are considered to be Color Revolutions in the relevant
literature are the Rose Revolution in Georgia (2003), the Orange Revolution in Ukraine
(2004/2005), and the Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan (2005). Some scholars like Julia Gerlach34,

31

Tucker, Joshua. 2007. Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist Colored
Revolutions. Perspectives on Politics. Vol. 5, No. 3. Page 539
32
Ibid.
33
Silitski, Vitali. 2010. Survival of the fittest: Domestic and international dimensions of the authoritarian reaction in
the former Soviet Union following the Colored Revolutions. Elsevier: Communist and Post-Communist Studies.
Vol.43 Page 342
34
Ibid.
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Valerie Bunce and Sharon Wolchik,35 Donnacha Beacháin and Abel Polese36 also view events in
Armenia (2003/2004, 2008, and 2013), Azerbaijan (2005, 2008, and 2013), Belarus (2006 and
2010) and Russia (2011/2012) as attempted and failed cases of Color Revolutions. The newest
addition to this family of Color Revolutions is the Velvet Revolution that happened in Armenia
in 2018, which is the central focus of this thesis.

Bulldozer Revolution
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) is a complex grouping of diverse
nationalities and religions that at times had differing priorities and positionings. In the 1990s,
Yugoslavia consisted of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia,
Slovenia, and Vojvodina.37 Furthermore, Yugoslavia hosted a wide array of religions like
Catholicism, Orthodox Christianity, and Islam. The collapse of Yugoslavia was especially violent,
accompanied by civil wars and ethnic conflicts that left established countries politically and
economically imbalanced and weakened. In 1992, Serbia and Montenegro, the only two
countries that agreed to remain united, created the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which
also included autonomous provinces Vojvodina and Kosovo. The situation in FRY was very
tense, especially because of the war in Kosovo.38 Slobodan Milosevic, the president of the FRY,

35

Bunce, Valerie & Wolchik, Sharon. 2011. Defeating Authoritarian Leaders in Postcommunist Countries. New York:
Cambridge University Press
36
Beacháin, Donnacha & Polese, Abel. 2010. The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics: Successes and
Failures. London&New York: Routledge
37
Finlan, Alastair. 2004. The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991–1999. Osprey Publishing. Page 13
38
Gerlach, Julia. 2014. Color Revolutions in Eurasia. Springer Briefs in Political Science. Page 4
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lead the country to hyperinflation, “an unemployment rate of almost 40 percent,”39 and
involved it in different conflicts with neighboring states to distract citizens from the domestic
problems. The early presidential elections were scheduled for September 24, 2000, and
Milosevic only gave eight weeks’ notice to the other presidential candidates.40 It is widely
assumed that this was done in order not to give opposing parties enough time to campaign and
effectively participate in elections -- Milosevic’s position and support group was not as strong
as it once was. The Center for Political Studies and Public Opinion Research of the Institute of
Social Sciences in University of Belgrade conducted an opinion poll on August 3-11, 2000, on
the eve of the 2000 Presidential elections, and “58 percent of the surveyed Serbs agreed with
the following statement, ‘Milosevic leads the country into disaster only to remain in power.’”.41
The opposition’s candidate was Vojislav Kostunica, who was the founder of the
Democratic Party in 1989, Democratic Party of Serbia in 1992, and was a member of Parliament
from 1990 until 1997.42 He had no ties to Milosevic or the West, was not associated with
Communism, stood for Moderate Nationalism, and campaigned for FRY’s integration into the
international arena.43 Kostunica was leading the polls, and this gave rise to protests in
Montenegro and Kosovo. Therefore, the Bulldozer Revolution is associated with Serbia rather
than with FRY. Both Milosevic and Kostunica claimed victory; however, the Federal Election
Commission called for a second ballot arguing that no one candidate has gotten the majority of

39
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votes. As a response to this, the opposition called for a general strike and boycott, which gave
rise to widespread demonstrations that started on September 27. While the Supreme Court
annulled the election results on October 4 and called for a re-run, protests and anti-Milosevic
movements became too strong and widespread to be ignored. The opposition put forward the
deadline of October 5 by which Milosevic was supposed to leave the office. The culmination of
all those events happened in the evening of October 5, when around half a million
demonstrators gathered in front of the government buildings and Radio Television of Serbia,
which was seen as the embodiment of Milosevic’s regime’s propaganda, and eventually
occupied them. Velimir Ilic, who was the mayor of Cacak, arrived to the protest in a bulldozer
and Ljubisav Dokic, an unemployed bulldozer operator, used Ilic’s vehicle to storm the Radio
Television of Serbia’s building.44 Neither police nor security forces intervened during those
events and Kostunica addressed people from the balcony of the Belgrade City Hall. On October
7, Slobodan Milosevic resigned from the president’s position while recognizing Kostunica’s
victory in the elections.45
Rose Revolution
Similar to Serbia, Georgia was weakened after gaining independence from the Soviet
Union in 1991 because of bloody civil wars and ethnic conflicts as well as a “state [was] prone
to informal and criminal networks, corruption, and powerful non-transparent informal
institutions”.46 Poverty and corruption were growing, while nepotism was strongly rooted in the

44
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country -- former president Shevardnadze’s family and allies controlled up to 70 % of the
country’s economy.47 In the years 2000 to 2003, both domestic and international support of
Eduard Shevardnadze declined drastically:48 in August 2003, “only 11 percent of the population
approved of Shevardnadze’s job performance”.49
On November 2, 2003, parliamentary elections took place during which Shevarnadze’s
and his ‘For New Georgia’ party’s main opposition was Mikhail Saakashvili and his party, the
‘United National Movement’ (UNM). Saakashvili situated himself as a pro-Western and antiRussia candidate who would fight against corruption and nepotism. Less than halfway through
the vote count, Georgia’s Central Elections Committee (CEC) had announced that president
Shevardnadze and his party ‘For New Georgia’, was leading in the polls with 21.32 percent of
votes, while Saakashvili and his party received ‘only’ 18.08 percent.50 However, “the results
from exit polls and parallel voter tabulation showed an opposite tendency: 26.60 percent for
Saakashvili and ‘only’ 18.92 percent for Shevardnadze”51. On November 20, the CEC officially
announced Shevardnadze’s victory which gave rise to large-scale protests and rallies. On
November 22, 2003, the inauguration of parliament was scheduled; however, during the event,
Saakashvili and his supporters accompanied by CNN cameras stormed the building and
disrupted the inauguration. After consulting with “Russian president, Vladimir Putin, and his
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foreign minister Igor Ivanov, Shevardnadze resigned and left for Moscow”.52 Saakashvili won
the presidential elections on January 4, 2004, by receiving 96 percent of votes and served as the
president of Georgia until 2013.53
Orange Revolution
The Orange Revolution in Ukraine took place after the 2004 presidential elections.
Leonid Kuchma, who ruled the country since 1994, could not participate in the 2004 elections
because of the two-term limit that is set in the Ukrainian Constitution; however, he backed
presidential candidate Viktor Yanukovych who was the leader of the ‘Party of the Regions’. The
opposition established a coalition called ‘Power to the People’, whose Presidential candidate
was Viktor Yushchenko. Yanukovych was pro-Russia and was backed by Kuchma and Russia,
while Yuschenko was rather pro-Western and was backed by Western NGOs and Western
powers. While 26 candidates were on the ballot, on the election day, October 31, 2004, the
presidential race quickly narrowed down to Yuschenko and Yanukovych. During the first round
of the election, both candidates received around 41 percent of the votes,54 while during the
second round “Yanukovych won by a slim margin of 49.42 percent to 46.69 percent”. 55 This
result was viewed by many as fraudulent and gave rise to demonstrations that culminated in
the Orange Revolution. This outcome was not surprising for Ukrainians as “over 70 percent of
those polled in 2003 did not believe there would be free and fair elections in 2004”. 56 Huge
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protests erupted in Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in the center of Kyiv, where
during the height of protests around 1,000,000 people participated.57 This huge national
movement led to Kuchma demanding a re-run of elections and the Supreme Court backing
Kuchma’s request. This time, Yushchenko won by receiving 55 percent of votes while
Yanukovych received 44 percent.58 Yanukovych tried to appeal election results; however, the
Supreme Court rejected his appeal, and Yuschenko was inaugurated on January 23, 2005.
Tulip Revolution
The Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan shared similar characteristics with the Rose
Revolution in Georgia, the main one being that the parliamentary elections became the catalyst
behind removing the president from the office. Askar Akayev was the president of Kyrgyzstan
since 1990. Under his rule, Kyrgyzstan became extremely corrupt and his family and allies
gained immense economic and political influence.59 In 2003, Akayev introduced some
constitutional changes that made it harder for the opposition to compete for power during
elections. However, on February 27, 2005, 27,400 candidates ran for 75 seats during the first
round of Parliamentary Elections and only 35 candidates won outright, which led to the second
round of elections on March 13.60 According to international observers, while the elections
“were the most competitive in the country’s history [they] still failed to meet international
standards”.61 Unlike other instances of Color Revolutions, demonstrations in Kyrgyzstan broke
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out in various cities, rather than just the capital. Uprisings in some cities (for example, in
Jalalabad, Osh) turned violent, were suppressed by the military and security forces, and
resulted in the deaths of several participants. On March 22, as a sign of protest, only two-thirds
of the new parliament members agreed to swear the oath to the constitution during the first
parliamentary meeting. On March 24 over 10,000 protestors gathered in Bishkek, where the
crowd broke into the White House, after which Akaev fled to Uzbekistan and then to Russia.62

Azerbaijan
Azerbaijan faced mass protests after the fraudulent 2005 parliamentary elections. The
Aliev family, first Heidar Aliev and later his son Ilham Aliev, governed the country for years
(since 1993). Through strict control of the economy and media, they gave rise to corruption and
nepotism. Both Alievs led the ‘New Azerbaijan Party’ (YAP). Before the 2005 Parliamentary
Elections, multiple opposing parties created coalitions to compete with the ‘New Azerbaijan
Party’, however, in Azerbaijan, the opposition had no voice as well as protest attempts and
media were brutally suppressed. When elections were announced to be fraudulent, despite
civic groups’ and youth movements’ involvement, large scale mobilization was not achieved:
“only approximately 15,000 people gathered out of a population of approximately 2,100,000 in
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the capital and 9,500,000 in the country”.63 Similar protest attempts occurred in 2013 when
Aliev ran and won his third term, however, those protests did not lead to any change as well.
Belarus
Belarus is known as the “‘last dictatorship in Europe’ and the ‘hotspot of Soviet
nostalgia’”.64 Alexander Lukashenko has served as the president of Belarus since 1994: he
amended the constitution to allow himself to run for the office indefinitely. Lukashenko
consolidated power by “establishing formal personal control over all key state institutions, inter
alia by abolishing the autonomy of local and regional governments”.65 The opposition was
harshly oppressed, and the government controlled every aspect of life. In 2006, for the first
time since 1994, Lukashenko faced a relatively unified opposition that was represented by two
candidates: Aliaksandr Milinkevich and Aliaksandr Kazulin. Protests erupted when it was
announced that Lukashenko won the elections by receiving 80 percent of the votes -- up to
20,000 protesters joined the demonstration.66 Protests were harshly oppressed, and
Lukashenko remained in the president’s cabinet.
Russia
Parliamentary Elections took place in Russia on December 4, 2011, and Presidential
Elections took place on March 4, 2012. Vladimir Putin has served as Russia’s president since
1999. According to the Russian constitution, a president can only serve two consecutive terms,
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which led Putin towards building an alliance with Dmitri Medvedev in 2008, during whose
presidency Putin served as the Prime Minister of the Russian Federation. In 2012, it was
announced that Medvedev would step back in favor of Putin. During the 2011 Parliamentary
Elections, “according to the Central Election Commission, four parties met the threshold of 7
percent, and ‘United Russia’ [Putin’s party] won more than 49 percent of the votes”.67 Protests
broke out after the Central Election Commission rejected “almost 90 percent of the claims for
irregularities on December 10, 2011”.68 While Putin’s re-election in 2012 did not necessarily
worsen the protests that started happening after the Parliamentary Elections, it was another
event that made people angry and made them lose trust in Putin. Those protests remained
non-violent until May 2012; however, they were violently ceased after June 2012.69

Armenia
Armenia is one of the oldest countries in the world, however, it has been systematically
conquered by many countries and empires (Greeks, Byzantines, Mongols, Ottomans, Russians,
etc.), so the history of Armenian independence is very patchy. During the 3500 years of written
history, Armenian borders and forms of governance underwent through many changes. During
the reign of King Tigranes the Great (140 – 55 BC), the country became, for a short time, the
strongest state to Rome's East.70 Armenians and many historians refer to Armenia as ‘sea to sea
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Armenia’ during those years as the kingdom extended from the Caspian Sea to the
Mediterranean Sea. The First Armenian Republic was established on May 28, 1918, after not
having independence for around 1000 years; however, this newfound independence had a very
short life. After the Armenian Genocide, the country was extremely weakened and had a very
small population of around 1.3 million people. It is generally agreed that this republic came to
an end by the late 1920s after it was conquered by the Soviet Red Army. The Second Republic
of Armenia, which is the one that still exists today, was established on September 21, 1991,
after Armenia declared its independence from the USSR.
Armenia has a strong tradition of mass protests, which proves to be an important
characteristic when it comes to successful or failed cases of Color Revolutions. In the 1980s,
protests erupted in Yerevan concerning the Nagorno Karabakh question and its reunion with
Armenia; later, in the 1990s, more demonstrations took place regarding Armenia’s dissolution
from the Soviet Union. Even before the rise of Color Revolutions in the 21st century, Armenians
were challenging election results through mass protests and demonstrations. In 1996, former
defense minister Vazgen Manukyan led mass protests challenging president Levon TerPetrosian and demanding the re-run of elections.
Mikayel Zolyan71 describes the Armenian political system as an “imitated democracy,”
where de jure democratic institutions are in place although de facto, all of those institutions are
ruled by the elites themselves and they do not hesitate to use those resources to their
advantage. In 2003, Stepan Demirchyan led mass demonstrations that sought to challenge the
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presidency of Robert Kocharyan and fraudulent election results.72 While technically, the
economy was on the rise since the 1990s, “most benefits from the economic growth were
concentrated in the hands of a tiny part of the population” and big businesses were controlled
by oligarchs with close ties to the government and Kocharyan himself.73 The first round of
elections occurred on February 19, 2003, and “the Central Electoral Commission announced
that two candidates, the incumbent Kocharyan (with 49.48 percent of the votes) and
Demirchyan (28.22 percent of the votes) would continue the struggle for the president’s
post”.74 The second round of elections took place on March 5, 2003, and Kocharyan won by
receiving 67.52 percent of the votes.75 International monitoring agencies viewed those
elections as highly fraudulent and below the level of international standards. However,
Kocharyan took the office, and the Constitutional Court did not cancel the election results.
The presidential elections of 2008 brought another wave of unsettlement and protests
to Armenia. Then prime minister Serzh Sargsyan was one of the presidential candidates,
although he was a member of the same party as Robert Kocharyan; this meant that if Sargsyan
won the election, no changes would be made in Armenia. Sargsyan won the elections, which
were recognized as highly corrupted. He served two five-year terms as a “highly unpopular
president”.76 Protestors once again took the streets after the 2008 presidential election to
“protest fraud and call for new elections”.77 Protests lasted for 12 days and “were brutally
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broken up by the police and troops of the Interior Ministry”.78 Eight people died and 400 were
wounded as a result of those events.79 Similar to 2003 demonstrations, they were peaceful;
however, this one got shut down violently.
During Sargsyan’s presidency, the country was crumbling -- oligarchs were getting richer
while for the regular people, unemployment and poverty rates were increasing. By the end of
Sargsyan’s 8-year presidency, Republicans proposed to make a constitutional change which
transferred executive power from the president to prime minister. A referendum took place in
December 2015. The referendum turnout was minimal (51 percent) and the changes were
passed with 66 percent of the vote.80 While the opposition claimed that the elections were
fraudulent and protests once again broke out, these demonstrations soon died down and the
changes were adopted. Before the referendum, Sargsyan promised that he would not run as a
Prime Minister, as his two terms as the President were coming to the end. Yet, he did not keep
his promise and was the only candidate from his party that was nominated; as Sargsyan’s party
had the majority in the Parliament, he was elected as the Prime Minister of Armenia. This
constitutional change was a loophole for Sargsyan to stay in power for longer and continue to
deepen inequalities -- making the rich even richer and the poor poorer.
Nikol Pashinyan is an activist and journalist who has always been interested and
involved in politics. Pashinyan had played a key role in the post-election protests in 2008. He
was blamed for organizing mass protests, for which he was arrested in 2009 and sentenced to
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seven years in prison. He was released in 2011 as part of the general amnesty. However, even
after his arrest, he was always very critical towards Sargsyan and his government.
After it became evident that Serzh Sargsyan will be elected as Armenia’s next Prime
Minister, on March 31, 2018, Pashinyan formed the ‘Take a Step’ initiative in the framework of
which he “set out on a protest march from his hometown [Gyumri] toward the capital of
Yerevan, 120 miles away”.81 He started his journey only with few people following him. During
his march, Pashinyan stopped in the small towns, met with people who live there, listened to
their problems and concerns. During the nights, he slept outside in a tent while feeding himself
and his followers with food that people from the nearby towns would bring for him. Pashinyan
showcased his whole journey through Facebook Lives. He would update his Facebook followers
about his current location, where he will be stopping for the night, and what are his upcoming
moves. On April 13, 17 days after the beginning of Pashinyan’s march, he and his 150 followers
reached Yerevan. There they were met with the Yerevan-based civil society group ‘Reject
Serzh’.82 Pashinyan’s movement became rather popular by the time he reached Yerevan -- the
number of his followers were in thousands and growing. The first mass demonstration took
place on the evening of April 13, after which some of the protestors staged a sit-down in France
Square, downtown Yerevan, which continued for a few days.83
Round-the-clock demonstrations continued until Serzh Sargsyan’s resignation on April
23. While Pashinyan was the main leader of the revolution, the movement was highly

81

Cooper, Marc. 2018. Armenia’s Revolution: A Flickering Light in a Darkening Europe. The Nation (thenation.com)
Lanskoy, Mariam & Suthers, Elspeth. 2019. Armenia's Velvet Revolution. Journal of Democracy, Vol. 30, No. 2.
Johns Hopkins University Press. Page 92
83
Hovhannisyan, Ani. 2018. Armenia’s “Velvet Revolution” – A Chronology. Hetq.am
82

30

decentralized: during those 10 days of mobilization, many smaller-scale protests and mass
actions took place all over Armenia. People took initiative and protested in many creative ways
-- be that by blocking the street with a piano and giving a Jazz concert, at a certain time each
evening banging on pots and pans, giving dance lessons in the streets, blocking the streets by
parked cars or strollers, or simply creating and sharing memes.84 85 The movement did not have
a central location or a tent city, which made it harder for the government to target
demonstrators.86
Similar to the other cases of Color Revolutions, young people played a critical role in this
movement. The youth was able to combine traditional demonstration methods such as
chanting slogans and blocking roads with new technologies -- most of the meetings were
organized in a matter of minutes through social media.87 Many students and high schoolers
were involved in the Velvet Revolution. They organized walkouts from classrooms, skipped
classes to protest, or simply took protests to their own educational institutions.
On April 17, when Serzh Sargsyan was officially elected as Armenia’s Prime Minister,
Pashinyan announced the beginning of the non-violent Velvet Revolution -- “mass
demonstrations, rallies, street closures paralyze the capital of Yerevan for days”.88 Pashinyan
was able to mobilize tens of thousands of demonstrators -- a number that is unheard of in
Armenia. On April 22, at 10 am, after being unable to ignore continuity and rising numbers of
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the demonstrators, Sargsyan agreed to meet with Pashinyan in Marriott Hotel in the Republic
Square. However, the ‘negotiations’ ended in a few minutes without reaching an agreement.
On their way out of the hotel, Pashinyan and two other deputies that have been visible and
vocal leaders of the Velvet Revolution -- Ararat Mirzoyan and Sasun Mikaelyan -- were taken
into custody.89 However, due to the decentralized nature of the Velvet Revolution, the protests
continued and on the next day, on April 23, Pashinyan, Mirzoyan and Mikaelyan got released
from detention while Serzh Sargsyan resigned from the role of the Prime Minister of Armenia.
The Velvet Revolution truly was a turning point in Armenian history. As it has been
demonstrated, the struggle for a political change was ongoing for more than ten years,
however, the Republican Party of Armenia and their party leaders were able to survive
throughout all those political events. It came as a shock not only to Armenians but to the world
that Pashinyan was able to manage the unthinkable -- peacefully overthrow the regime that has
been in power for more than a decade.
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Chapter 2: External Factors that Caused the Velvet Revolution

As Chapter 1 demonstrated, the Armenian Velvet Revolution of 2018, was not unique in
its kind -- many similar revolutions happened all over Eastern Europe since the early 2000s.
When one thinks of revolutions and how they come to be, the first reason that comes to mind
is the internal struggles that the country faces -- be that corruption and unjust government,
economic hardships, etc. Chapter 3 of this thesis will focus on the internal struggles that
Armenia was facing before and during the Velvet Revolution happened. This Chapter, however,
focuses on the external forces that were affecting Armenia in this specific time that made the
Velvet Revolution possible.
Most of the literature that focuses on the Color Revolutions, puts the biggest emphasis
on internal factors that push people to take over the streets and protest, however, external
factors can both enable as well as prevent revolutions from happening. Hence, it is important to
consider those as well and try to understand their role in the Velvet Revolution when one wants
to have the full picture of it. For this thesis, the three external factors chosen for further
consideration are the geographic location of Armenia and how that makes the country more
susceptible to revolutions, Russian influence, and Western influence (mainly western NGOs).
Those specific factors were chosen after conducting a careful analysis of other Color
Revolutions -- specifically Bulldozer, Rose, Orange and Tulip Revolutions -- as specifically those
factors carried prevailing importance in the success of those uprisings. Additionally, when one
investigates failed cases of Color Revolutions, it becomes evident that those factors played a
huge role in those cases as well.
33

Democratic Diffusion and Modular Action
Democratic diffusion theory argues that “democratic ideas and norms spread across
borders: the more democratic states in the region, the more likely an authoritarian state is to
become democratic.”90 Democratic Diffusion theory is rather descriptive: Valerie Bunce and
Sharon Wolchik define diffusion as a “process wherein new ideas, institutions, policies, models
or repertoires of behavior spread geographically from a core site to other sites.”91 This spread
can happen within a country or across borders. To put diffusion into the framework of Color
Revolutions, one can argue that the diffusion of democratic ideas, norms, policies, etc. took
place in Eastern Europe/Post-Soviet space. Bunce and Wolchik argue that the electoral model
of democratization was developed and applied in states like Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia
from 1996 to 1998, after which this model was embraced and implemented by opposition
groups and citizens in states like Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan.92 Diffusion does not
happen automatically: it is a conscious effort by groups and people to bring changes that are
happening in one country to their own countries. Diffusion requires knowledge of new
developments, commitment to work towards bringing certain developments to the country as
well as values and interests that would direct those groups and people towards diffusion.93
Diffusion can happen through unofficial sources as well as through more organized ways.
Scholars tend to highlight three specific methods through which democratic diffusion occurs:
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demonstration effects (or emulation), learning, and purposive action.94 Vanderhill describes
demonstration effects (or emulation) as the informal processes by which ideas spread across
borders through actors that find situations in both states rather similar and find appeal in
proposed changes.95 Another important characteristic of diffusion is that groups learn different
techniques from one another and they take lessons from successes and failures of other
groups: “learning is a process where actors find tactics, strategies, or frames used elsewhere to
be helpful for achieving their own goals.”96 Last but not least, diffusion can happen through
more formal “purposive” ways, whereby certain groups actively seek and work towards
spreading ideas they believe in. Vanderhill describes three ways in which the democratic
diffusion mechanism occurs: “direct, interpersonal networks (relational); indirect, impersonal
connections, such as through the spread of ideas by means of the media; mediated networks,
where a “third actor” connects pro-democracy activists in different countries.”97
The proposed definition of Democratic Diffusion Theory has two distinct components:
location and regime type. A majority of scholars argue that the biggest variable for democratic
diffusion is the physical or geographic location -- countries that have closer proximity to each
other have higher chances to be affected by this ‘diffusion’. Harvey Starr specifically mentions
that “many governmental transitions were not random nor free from the regional context geographic or otherwise - within which they took place.”98 Daniel Brinks and Michael Coppedge
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introduce the idea of “neighbor emulation” which is “a tendency for neighboring countries to
converge toward a shared level of democracy or nondemocracy” (Brinks’ and Coppedge’s study
finds that “neighbor emulation” is significant).99 Brinks and Coppedge through their study find
strong support for the argument that countries tend to become more like their geographic
neighbors over time due to ‘diffusion’.100 However, countries that are in a region where
democratic governments are the majority have higher chances of becoming democratic.
Additionally, as the number of democracies rises in the world, there are more chances for those
countries that turned democratic to stay one for a longer-term.101 The main reason why
neighboring countries tend to have similar regimes is the assumption that countries tend to get
rewarded when their regimes are similar to their neighboring countries regimes’.102 Those
rewards can vary -- better relations with neighbors, trade, more investments, higher regional
security, etc. Brinks and Coppedge further argue that a bigger gap in the level of democracy
between neighboring countries will put higher levels of pressure on the less democratic country
to become more democratic.103 Studies also have shown that close geographic proximity allows
more spontaneous forms of diffusion, be that through interactions between citizens of different
countries, economic and business exchanges, or cultural ties.104 Those forms of democratic
diffusion happen “without any collaboration, imposition, or otherwise programmed effort on
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the part of any of the actors.”105 While those spontaneous diffusion mechanisms might not be
an end in themselves, they can serve as initial triggers that can lead to democratic change.
It seems like a no brainer that location matters -- being in a region where change and
revolutions take place does affect people’s actions and aspirations. Diffusion can have a great
effect on how masses start seeing and reacting to the existing government -- people’s attitudes
might change to the extent to which people are willing to take actions against the autocratic or
unfair regime. Once people start seeing how their neighboring countries are becoming more
democratic, and the possible positive impacts that democratic change is having on those
citizens’ lives, people become more willing to fight for democracy as they see how rewarding
the prize can be and what is the most important, that the change is possible. If one assumes
that “popular opinion toward a political regime matters for regime survival, a change in popular
perception can bring about regime change.”106
While most of the emphasis is on location, some scholars argue that Democratic
Diffusion has higher chances to spread between countries that have similar regime types.
Edward Goldring and Sheena Chestnut Greitens argue that “tactics that work against a regime
of one type will have a higher chance of success if they are applied to other regimes in the same
regime-type category.”107 Goldring’s and Greitens’ argument is that even if protests do spread
along geographic lines, regime type is the main determining factor of whether protests will turn
into something bigger and eventually lead to democratization or they will have no substantial

105

Ibid.
Vanderhill, Rachel. 2017. Active Resistance to Democratic Diffusion. Communist and Post-Communist Studies.
Vol. 50, No. 1. Page 43
107
Goldring, Edward & Greitens, Sheena Chestnut. 2020. Rethinking Democratic Diffusion: Bringing Regime Type
Back In. Comparative Political Studies. Vol. 53 No.2. Page 321
106

37

effect. The explanation that Goldring and Greitens provide for their argument is that different
regimes have different structures, mechanisms and tools with which they combat
demonstration/revolution attempts and those mechanisms make them either susceptible or
resilient to change. This leads to the argument that when protestors take ideas and inspiration
from other groups, it is more likely for those ideas to work in a country that has a similar regime
type to the country where the change happened because each regime has different levels and
points of vulnerability and this vulnerability based on regime type does affect whether
democratic diffusion is successful or not.108 Protestors will demand regime change, however, a
breakdown will only occur if the regime is vulnerable to transition -- be that lack of will or
capacity to diffuse protests. Some regimes will try to come to an agreement with their citizens
which will allow them to stay in power while others will use force to stop protests altogether.
Based on this logic, if a change of regime was able to happen in one authoritarian state there is
a high probability that those tactics would work in other authoritarian states as well. Goldring’s
and Greitens’ study shows that “similar regime autocratic breakdown is positive and statistically
significant at 99% confidence”109 which means that “autocratic breakdowns among similar
autocratic regimes have a positive effect on the likelihood of autocratic breakdown.”110 In other
tests conducted during this study “the positive and statistically significant effect of Similar
regime autocratic breakdown holds at least at 99% confidence”111 which further showcases the
importance of this variable. While Goldring and Greitens in their study do not find geographic
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proximity as important as other studies do, they go as far as assuming that the geographic
proximity variable is insignificant. However, they also argue, if one assumes that geographic
proximity is important, one can also assume that “the effect of regime type on breakdown is
particularly strong when countries are closer to each other.”112
Diffusion theory by no means explains the initial reasons for the emergence of
revolutionary ideas, however, that is not this theory’s goal -- it is supposed to explain why
revolutions tend to spread. Different studies give different reasons for Democratic Diffusion;
however, location and similar regime types are two of the main arguments presented in this
theory.
Mark Beissinger introduces the idea of Modular Action which is an action that is based
on “the prior successful example of others -- a model being, in one of Webster's definitions, ‘an
example for imitation or emulation’.”113 When the notion of modularity is applied to collective
action (demonstrations, revolution attempts, etc.), one thinks of “borrowing of mobilizational
frames, repertoires, or modes of contention across cases.”114 Color Revolutions are great
examples of Modular Action, as prior successful examples inspire people to act and make a
change. Moreover, each revolution creates a framework that has been borrowed by the next
revolutionaries in line: “each successful democratic revolution has produced an experience that
has been consciously borrowed by others, spread by NGOs, and emulated by local social
movements, forming the contours of a model.”115 One can understand this notion best when
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looking into how during Color Revolutions, youth groups, which were the main engines of
change, were trained and taught by each other. Otpor, the Serbian youth group that played a
central role in the Bulldozer Revolution, traveled all around the world and taught local groups
how to organize democratic revolutions. Otpor activists trained Kmara activists, the youth
group in Georgia that organized the Rose Revolution, a few months before the revolution, and
continued mentoring them during the Rose Revolution itself. Otpor members trained Kmara
members in techniques of non-violent resistance and as one of the founders of Kmara noted,
Otpor was “a huge source of inspiration for the group.”116 Pora, the youth movement in
Ukraine that was in charge of the Orange Revolution, was influenced by both Otpor and Kmara.
Fourteen Pora leaders were trained by Otpor members at the Center for Non-Violent
Resistance in Serbia on how to “organize a movement, motivate voters, and develop mass
actions.”117 In Kyrgyzstan, a youth group named Kelkel modeled their form of resistance based
on the experience of Otpor and Pora after several Kyrgyz young people were in Ukraine during
the Orange Revolution as election observers.
Modular Action is incentivized by the prior success of other groups as well as by the
gains one would receive by being associated with a successful example.118 Prior successful
examples normally raise the probability of action in other states as actors in those states have
more hopes of successful outcomes. After each successful case, there is an even higher
probability of more actions being taken by different groups in different states: “within modular
democratic revolution cross-case influence is not only identified with accelerated movement
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formation, but with an increased probability of action as well.”119 Actors who were successful in
making a change are often more than willing to share their experience and knowledge with
other groups partly because of ideological reasons -- they truly believe that what they did was
correct and the best option for their country and citizens. Otpor, Kmara and Pora created
international consulting centers where they promote democratic values and train ‘future
changemakers’ in the spirit of modular revolution. Mark Beissinger argues that the spread of
modular action is not random; usually it is “shaped across space and time by certain preexisting structural conditions.”120 Goldring and Greitens mention that recent studies in political
science show that “connectivity rather than geography, proximity and contiguity”121 can be
accounted for much of the spread of democratization movements, which supports Beissinger’s
model of Modular Action. Modular Actions become possible by the sense of
interconnectedness across different actors, which is produced by “common institutional
characteristics, histories, cultural affinities, or modes of domination.”122 This allows groups in
different countries to draw parallels across states and feel much more interconnected, which
suggests that success in one country can be mimicked in other ones as well.
All of these theories come to establish one fact -- location matters. Geographically,
being situated in an area where revolutions happen, increases the chances of the state having a
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revolution itself. Demonstrations do not arise out of nowhere and they do spread across
borders, be that by certain mechanisms or purely because of geographic proximity.

Linkage and Leverage
One cannot write about the Color Revolutions and not touch bases on Western and
Russian influence on the region. The region itself is highly complicated because of history,
demographic making, and weak state formations. While historically, many states in this region
have strong connections to Russia, Western countries are putting more and more attention and
effort into influencing those states. In some cases, those efforts are successful, while in others,
Russian influence remains the dominant power concerning the state.
Lucan Way and Steven Levitsky put a lot of emphasis on linkage and leverage as they
argue that those are essential components in understanding how countries are interconnected.
Leverage is the government’s vulnerability to external pressure while linkage is the “density of
ties (economic, political, diplomatic, social, and organizational) and cross-border flows (of trade
and investment, people, and communication) between particular countries.”123 Way and
Levitsky explore countries’ linkage and leverage to the United States and the West, however,
the same concepts can be applied to the linkage and leverage of other parts of the world
(Russia). Both linkage to and leverage by the West should be high for a country to transition to
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democracy. If there are high leverage and weak linkage or vice versa, there are lower chances
for democratization.124
Tomila Lankina, Alexander Libman and Anastassia Obydenkova in Authoritarian and
Democratic Diffusion in Post-Communist Regions argue that European Union aid enhances
regional democracy, as having “the effect of countering external autocratic influences that work
through Soviet-era interregional economic ties.”125 Powerful autocratic countries like Russia
and China are able to dissuade countries from becoming democratic through strong economic
ties and other forms of leverage.126 For example, the Russian market is extremely important for
almost all Post-Soviet states’ national economies (the only exceptions being Azerbaijan,
Turkmenistan and Georgia): “25% to 45% of exports of Belarus, Ukraine, and Moldova, and 8%
to 25% of exports from Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, and Lithuania are targeted at the Russian
market.”127

Western NGO-s
Western countries as well as the United States have been highly involved in Color
Revolutions and promoting democratization and Western values in Eastern Europe and the
Post-Soviet space. The US government has spent around $41 million promoting anti-Milošević
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civil society groups like Otpor before the Bulldozer Revolution.128 The Global Nonviolent Action
Database states that the United States “had given $15 million to independent media in Serbia
while spending $1 billion in the form of cruise missiles and other weapons to fight Milosevic.”129
Similarly, the US government spent $65 million promoting democracy in Ukraine during and
after the Orange Revolution.130 Most of this money was transferred to Ukrainian NGOs that
played a central role in the Orange Revolution through third party NGOs.131 For example, USAID
gave millions of dollars to the Poland-America-Ukraine Cooperation Initiative (PAUCI) (initiative
administered by Freedom House), which relocated those funds to numerous Ukrainian NGOs. 132
It is generally believed that since the 2000s, the United States developed a more aggressive
approach towards the democratization efforts of Post-Soviet space. This has to do with the
growing conflict between the Bush administration and Post-Communist governments like those
in Belarus, Ukraine, Russia, and Uzbekistan regarding foreign policy and internal human rights
practices.133 In October 2004, President Bush signed the Belarus Democracy Act through which
the US assisted movements in Belarus, the goal of which was to overthrow the Lukashenka
regime.134 Kmara, on the other hand, received $350,000 from the local branch of the Soros
Foundation as well as Kmara and other opposition groups received financial and organizational
support from the National Democratic Institute.135 Moreover, the movement in Georgia was
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supported by the US as well: in May 2005, Bush traveled to Tbilisi where he praised the Rose
Revolution and suggested that other states in the Caucasus and Central Asia should see this
movement in Georgia as an example and inspiration.136 Otpor, one of the first successful prodemocracy groups able to conduct a revolution, was strongly sponsored by the US government
and Western NGOs (especially monetarily); they traveled all around the world and trained local
groups on how to organize revolutions and revolt against autocratic governments.
George Soros’ Open Society Foundations is the main organization that keeps coming up
when one researches the West’s and Western NGOs’ influences on the Color Revolutions. Open
Society Foundations is the world’s largest private funder of groups that work towards justice,
democratic governance and human rights.137 For over three decades, the Open Society
Foundations have had expenditures of more than $15 billion.138 George Soros and his
foundation are especially disdained by authoritarian governments -- “The Soros Foundation, for
instance, no longer operates in Belarus, Russia, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan because of
growing hostility from host governments.”139 In 2018, Open Society Foundations closed its
office in Budapest, Hungary, and moved it to Berlin, Germany as Hungarian prime minister
Viktor Orban’s government became more and more hostile towards the foundation. This is
especially notable as George Soros himself is Hungarian and, what is even more anticlimactic, in
1989 Orban studied in Oxford with a scholarship from the Soros Foundation. The president of
the Open Society Foundations, Patrick Gaspard, explained his relocation by saying: “The
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government of Hungary has denigrated and misrepresented our work and repressed civil
society for the sake of political gain, using tactics unprecedented in the history of the European
Union …. It has become impossible to protect the security of our operations and our staff in
Hungary from arbitrary government interference.”140
Nikol Pashinyan, during his victory speech on April 23, 2018, used revolutionary
language while pushing back against insinuations of foreign interference -- "It's a pure
Armenian Velvet Revolution," Pashinyan announced.141 There is no solid proof that the Velvet
Revolution was sponsored by the West, however, there is no proof that it was not either. Open
Society Foundations’ Armenian office director Larisa Minasian put out multiple statements
denying the Soros Foundation having any connection to the Velvet Revolution and Nikol
Pashinyan. Open Society Foundations supports numerous NGOs in Armenia that work in the
field of human rights and women’s rights, and that organize anti-corruption and election
monitoring campaigns as well as other initiatives that are supposed to hold the government
responsible for its actions. Those organizations and their leaders did have an important role in
contributing to the success of the Velvet Revolution and many of the leaders of those NGOs
hold high-level positions in the new government.142 This leads to much speculation regarding
Soros shaping the outcome of the Velvet Revolution and being involved in it through local
NGOs, especially when it is well-known that this has been the tactic used during other Color
Revolutions. Over the past two decades, Open Society Foundations has given about $53 million
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in grants to a multitude of Armenian NGOs and individuals. The money has been spent on
hundreds of projects in areas that include education, human rights, judicial reforms, and
media.143
George Soros’ name keeps resurfacing during political debates in Armenia, specifically
by the cabinet members of the ex-president and prime minister Serzh Sargsyan and his political
supporters. They portray Soros and his foundation as an outside agent that tries to interfere
with the regular course of life in Armenia, change the culture, and impose values that are not
‘Armenian’. One of the biggest allegations that anti-Soros groups and individuals are using
against the foundation is that ‘Soros Network’ is trying to get same-sex marriage legalized in
Armenia.144 Armenia is inherently a country that is homophobic and puts a high value into the
‘traditional family’ model. Speculating that an organization promotes LGBTQ rights is an
effective method for discrediting it in Armenia, as it is almost given that the public will turn
against the organization in that case. It was argued that same-sex marriage is trying to be
passed through ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating
Violence Against Women and Domestic Violence (Istanbul Convention).145 Gender rights and
domestic violence is another ‘hot topic’ in Armenia that has been systematically overlooked
and forbidden to talk about. Victim blaming and domestic violence, toxic masculinity and
traditional gender norms are embedded in Armenian society, and it is not surprising that the
signing of the Istanbul Convention faced so much backlash. However, the catch here is that the
Istanbul Convention was signed in January 2018 by the previous government (Serzh Sargsyan’s
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government), which means that if the Soros Foundation perpetrated the signing of the
convention, it would be logical to assume that Sargsyan and his cabinet were associated with
the Soros Foundation as well. For example, Eduard Sharmazanov, a former Republican public
official who is now a member of Armenia’s opposition, “refutes the convention as
‘contradictory to our set of values… there must be no alternative to the traditional family
model’,”146 however Sharmazanov was a government official when the convention was signed
and he had nothing to say against it back then.
Vitali Balasanyan, a long-standing government official, in his exclusive interview to
LIVEnews.am in October 2019, officially announced that the Soros Foundation had connections
to Velvet Revolution, however, he refused to provide specific evidence.147 Balasanyan believes
that the Velvet Revolution was a project organized by outside actors and it was by no means a
people’s movement. Once again, however, one needs to consider where Balasanyan stands in
the political spectrum -- he is fully against Nikol Pashinyan and his new government, and he
believes that Pashinyan unlawfully took over the government and put Armenia on the route of
destruction. This is one of the classic cases where an association with the Soros Foundation is
seen as something negative and destructive.
In this thesis, the Soros Foundation and its connection to the Velvet Revolution are not
necessarily seen as something negative. Organizing a revolution is not an easy process -- one
needs both knowledge and money to be able to do that. In all the successful cases of Color
Revolutions interference from outside had a fairly large role in the success of the movement. As
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it has already been mentioned, there is no proof that the Soros Foundation, the United States,
or any other international actor had any involvement and contribution in the Velvet Revolution.
However, when one looks into other cases of Color Revolutions (both successful cases and
failed attempts) it seems highly possible that the West played a role in this revolution as well.

Russia
After the collapse of the USSR, Armenia was in a position where a quick choice of allies
should have been made. Being a small country surrounded by neighboring states that pose a
threat to its well-being and integrity is not a position that any country wants to find itself in.
One of the first nationalistic movements that were advocating for the dissolution of the Soviet
Union and state independence started in Armenia, which also led to generally negative feelings
towards what ended up being the Russian Federation in Armenia. Regardless, the first
presidents of Armenia and Russia -- Levon Ter-Petrosyan and Boris Yeltsin -- from the get-go
have had good relationships with each other as well as shared similar visions of how the two
countries should develop in the future.148 Yeltsin was envisioning Russia’s future as a more
democratic country with strong Euro-Atlantic integration.149 This led Armenia to believe that
renewed ties with Russia meant ties with the West as Russia was seen as a continuation of it.
It is impossible to analyze Armenian internal politics as well as its external relations with
other states, without talking about Nagorno Karabakh, which is a small, unrecognized, de facto

148
149

Shirinyan, Anahit. 2019. Armenia’s Foreign Policy Balancing in an Age of Uncertainty. Chatham House. Page 6
Ibid.

49

independent state in the South Caucasus. While Nagorno Karabakh has a long history, what is
relevant for this thesis is that in 1921 the Bolsheviks promised Armenia Nagorno Karabakh,
Nakhchivan and Zangezur, while at the same time to please Turkey they promised them
Nagorno Karabakh and Nakhchivan (Zangezur would go to Armenia). Bolsheviks chose to keep
their promise to Turkey and on July 7, 1923, the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast was
established within the Azerbaijan SSR. For some time, relative peace was established and while
there was tension between Azeris and Armenians regarding Nagorno Karabakh, the situation
was rather manageable. On February 13, 1988, demonstrations started to emerge in
Stepanakert, the capital city of Nagorno Karabakh, which were directed towards the demand
for unification with the Armenian Republic. A few days later mass demonstrations emerged in
Yerevan, Armenia as well. This led to an ongoing conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan,
which at times led to direct clashes, deaths and displacement of the local population. In 1991,
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Nagorno Karabakh declared itself an independent
republic, however, it is not recognized by any other state. A ceasefire between Armenia and
Azerbaijan was reached on May 12, 1994. Even after the ceasefire clashes between the two
sides are not rare. The biggest reemergence of conflict happened in April 2016, when a four-day
war broke out between Armenia/Nagorno Karabakh and Azerbaijan.
In 1993, Turkey closed its borders with Armenia in solidarity with Azerbaijan, which was
followed by an economic blockade, which was supposed to push Armenia towards making
concessions on Nagorno Karabakh.150 Two out of four borders with neighboring states are
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closed for Armenia (borders with Turkey and Azerbaijan) which puts Armenia in an especially
vulnerable position. Armenia was in desperate need of an ally that would be able to protect it
and side with Armenia when it came to regional conflict, especially if an even bigger fallout with
Turkey happened. In 1995, to solidify Armenian-Russian relations, a military agreement ratified
the deployment of Russia’s military base in Gyumri, Armenia’s second-largest city after Yerevan,
for 25 years.151 In 2010, a renewed agreement extended Russia’s lease of the base until 2044.152
In 2015, the two countries created an integrated air-defense system as well as a Joint Group of

Forces, launched in 2016.153 Throughout the years, Armenia got more and more dependent on
Russia economically as well as had to rely on Russia for increased security, which allowed Russia
to hold a dominant position in Armenian-Russian relations and follow its own agenda that at
times came to the expense of Armenia. From 2002 on, Russian Federation and state-affiliated
companies started a series of equity-for-debt swaps and gradually acquired “strategically
critical Armenian assets, including in telecommunications, railways, and electricity and gas
distribution networks”,154 which allowed Russia to have an even tighter grip on Armenia. It is
important to mention that similar types of debts were forgiven by Russia for states like Syria,
Iraq, Cuba, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.155
While Armenia clearly has close ties with Russia, relations with other countries and
especially Western Europe tried to be maintained as well. While Russia itself has rather close
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connections to Turkey and Azerbaijan (which throughout the years became tighter), they felt
unease “with Armenia’s foreign policy of complementarity, whether in relation to expanding
ties with the West or pursuing closer cooperation with Iran”.156 It is important to explore
Russia’s relations with Turkey and Azerbaijan as those two countries present the biggest threat
to Armenia’s and Nagorno Karabakh’s safety. Russia and Turkey share a common sense of
discontent towards the West -- “the Russian–Turkish rapprochement gave each a degree of
leverage vis-à-vis the US and the EU”.157 Russia and Turkey started using the language of
‘strategic partnership’ once economic and political ties between those two countries grew and
became stronger in the Black Sea region. When it comes to Azerbaijan, Russia is specifically
interested in its strategically important location and energy reserves. It would be rather
disadvantageous for Russia if Azerbaijan created stronger ties with the West, hence Russia
supplies arms to Azerbaijan to retain its control in the region as well as to make Azerbaijan
dependent on Russia when it comes to new arms. Ongoing Nagorno Karabakh conflict
constantly pushes Armenia towards purchasing arms to stay competitive during the conflict,
and Armenia’s main arms supplier is Russia, which sells arms to Armenia with relatively low
prices. However, while Russia presents itself as Armenia’s main ally when it comes to defense,
from 2000 onward, Russia has been supplying arms to Azerbaijan as well -- “Russia provided 55
percent of Azerbaijan’s and 96 percent of Armenia’s arms imports between 2007 and 2011. By
2015, its share of Azerbaijan’s arms imports had risen to 85 percent”.158 While Russia presents
increased arms sales to Azerbaijan as simply an economic endeavor, it is worrisome for
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Armenia to see closer collaboration between those two countries. In 2014, ex-president Serzh
Sargsyan, during one of his interviews mentioned that while it is discomforting for Armenians
that their main strategic partner is selling arms to Azerbaijan, he is hopeful that if Armenia will
need Russia’s help in protecting its borders Russia will do what is right and step in to protect
and side with Armenia.159 However, Armenia does understand that for Russia keeping its
influence over the region is a top priority, hence, when it comes to the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict, Russia will refrain from fully fulfilling its obligations towards Armenia. The argument
has been presented that Russia should ensure that a relatively equal number of arms is sold to
both countries, in order to keep the balance in the region160 as the United States and European
Union mainly forgo selling arms to Armenia or Azerbaijan in line with an Organization for
Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) voluntary embargo.161
In July 2010, Armenia and the European Union started negotiations over an Association
Agreement which also included the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement
(DCFTA). Negotiations lasted around 3 years -- the technical talks with the EU were concluded
in July and the agreement was supposed to be signed at the Eastern Partnership Summit in
Vilnius, Lithuania in late November.162 Everything supposedly was set in stone regarding EUArmenia Association Agreement, until September 3rd when the Kremlin’s website put out a
statement that declared Armenia joining the Eurasian Economic Union instead of signing the EU
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alternative.163 The Kremlin announced that “The presidents reaffirmed the focus of the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Armenia on the further development of economic integration in
the Eurasian territory … In this context, Mr. Sargsyan said Armenia had decided to join the
Customs Union and take the necessary practical steps to subsequently participate in the
formation of the Eurasian Economic Union”.164 Vladimir Putin and Serzh Sargsyan met in August
2012 and had a discussion regarding Armenia’s possible involvement in the customs union of
Russia, followed by meetings in December 2012 and March 2013, however, no public
announcements were made and supposedly no concrete outcome was reached.165 Moreover,
some Armenian political leaders including then Prime Minister Tigran Sarkisian, “continued to
argue that Armenia cannot join the Russian-dominated trade bloc because it has no common
border with any of its member states”.166 This unexpected change of events came as a surprise
to EU officials as Sargsyan did not communicate with them anything regarding Armenia’s
decision on joining Eurasian Economic Union. Swedish Foreign Affairs Minister Carl Bildt
Tweeted: “Seems as if Armenia will break talks on free trade agreement with EU and integrate
with Russia instead. U-turn”.167 Serzh Sargsyan on his part announced that this is not a rejection
of EU and Armenia is still ready to sign an Association Agreement with the EU in November
(without Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area Agreement (DCFTA)): “This decision is not a
rejection of our dialogue with the European institutions. During recent years, Armenia, with the
support of European partners held a number of important institutional reforms. And today's
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Armenia, in this sense, is considerably a more effective and competitive state than years ago.
We intend to continue these reforms also in the future”.168 EU Commissioner for Enlargement
and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan Fule however announced that the Association
Agreement can only be signed in conjunction with the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade
Area Agreement (DCFTA): “the agreement on a deep and comprehensive free trade area is part
of the Association Agreement. It is a single document, and one cannot be separated from the
other”.169 While some EU officials concluded that Armenia’s 2013 U-turn on the EU Association
Agreement simply showcased once again “Armenia’s inherent pro-Russian stance and that the
EU should move on,”170 one should look further into Armenia’s situation during that time
period and at how Russia directly or indirectly warned Armenia against signing the EU
Association Agreement.
In April 2013, while Armenia was in close negotiations with the EU, “Russia’s Gazprom
monopoly raised the gas price by 50 percent. The gas tariffs for Armenian households rose by
only 18 percent last month as the Armenian government pledged to subsidize the rest of the
price hike”.171 Armenia is dependent on Gazprom for its gas supplies, which highly restricts the
Armenian government during negotiations.172 This sharp rise of gas prices would have put
Armenia in a very vulnerable position, where around 30 percent of the population lives under
the poverty line as an increase in gas prices would lead to a general increase in prices. After
Armenia joined the Eurasian Economic Union, gas prices for Armenia were once again
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decreased to the initial price. Armenia’s then Energy and Natural Resources Minister Armen
Movsisyan announced: “now that Armenia has decided to join the Customs Union …. Armenia’s
natural gas price will depend on domestic gas prices in Russia”.173 This is an outstanding
example of how Russia utilizes its advantages to achieve its objectives, which in this case were
to prevent Armenia from creating a closer alliance with the European Union.
Another worry that Armenia had that served as a reason for joining the Eurasian
Economic Union was the tense relations with Azerbaijan over Nagorno Karabakh. As already
mentioned, Russia is the top arms provider for Armenia and while it has always sold arms to
Azerbaijan as well, in 2013, “a shipment of heavy weapons worth nearly US$ 1 billion to
Azerbaijan”174 was conducted. While this was clearly alarming news to Armenia, the Armenian
government was hesitant in criticizing Russia, as close defense cooperation with it is essential to
Armenia. In July 2013, the same month as a US$1 billion heavy weaponry shipment to
Azerbaijan took place, Vyacheslav Kovalenko, who was Russia's ambassador to Armenia until
March 2013, cautioned the Armenian government that they are risking to alienate Russia if they
sign the Association Agreement with the EU.175 Ergo, one can argue that joining the Eurasian
Economic Union had a security rationale and as Serzh Sargsyan said: “when you are part of one
system of military security it is impossible and ineffective to isolate yourself from a
corresponding economic space”.176
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While the rise of gas prices and huge arms sales to Azerbaijan were the main two
actions that Russia took during this period, numerous Russian politicians, analysts, political
scientists and others warned and indirectly pressured Armenia against creating closer ties with
the European Union. Andrey Yepifantsev, a Russian analyst, went as far as announcing that “the
forthcoming association deal could lead Moscow to withdraw its security guarantees to
Armenia and become more supportive of Azerbaijan in the Karabakh conflict,”177 which
Armenia simply cannot afford. Michael Kambeck, founder of the European Friends of Armenia
noted that “… [the] U-turn [by Sarkisian] was not a free choice”.178 The Armenian population
and political analysts viewed Sargsyan’s decision as rather forced -- becoming a signatory of the
Eurasian Economic Union meant that the Armenian government is giving up their control over
the state’s sovereignty, especially in a realm of foreign policy decision making.179
Russia has always been cautious regarding any political moves Armenia makes, both
internally and externally. For example, in 2015, the Electric Yerevan movement was launched
(June 17, 2015 – September 11, 2015) in response to a hike in electricity prices. This
development was the result of mismanagement by Electric Networks of Armenia (ENA),180
which was owned by Russian Energy Company Inter RAO UES.181 On June 17, a decision was
made “to increase electricity tariffs from the beginning of August by more than 16 percent,”182
which for citizens of a poverty-ridden country like Armenia is a huge burden. ENA has
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accumulated debt due to overpaying suppliers and contractors as well as because of internal
corruption that took place in the company. Director of the ENA, Yevgeny Bibin, did publicly
admit mismanagement of the company, however, when he was invited to a meeting by the
Armenian Regulatory Commission to explain tariff hikes and defend himself against corruption
allegations, he did not even attend the meeting.183 While those protests were not specifically
against the Russian government, many of the protesters did hold anti-Russian attitudes. Electric
Yerevan was organized by a small number of young people and was shared and promoted
through social media. Armenia has a strong culture of protests and demonstrations; however,
the activist networks were rather informal and did not have strong foundations because there
were no NGOs and social movement organizations that had strong participation in mobilization
efforts. Protests were rather peaceful -- protestors were able to take over and block one of the
main avenues in Yerevan, Baghramyan Avenue, which leads to the Armenian president’s
residence. The number of protestors varied from a few hundred to a few thousand at any time
of the day. The situation became rather tense when in the early hours of 23 June protestors
were brutally dispersed by the police using water cannons. More than 200 people were
arrested, including journalists who were treated rather brutally -- their cameras and phones
were smashed, they were beaten up.184 However, this only sparked the protests further and
even more people started to partake in those protests. It is not clear whether Russia had
anything to do with this brutal effort to breakdown the protests, yet the Kremlin saw external
involvement in this movement as well and “saw a third-party plot agitating for a Maidan-style
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revolution”.185 This was also the narrative that Russian journalists who were covering the
protests were advancing. Participants of Electric Yerevan were especially unhappy with the
Russian media’s coverage -- Armenian blogger Izabella Abgaryan noted that “Our growing
mistrust towards the Russian media is their own fault …. They are comparing this protest to
Ukraine's Maidan, they are saying that protesters are armed, it's a complete lie”.186
Armenians have always had strong ties to Russia. It is not uncommon to hear Armenians
saying that Russia is Armenia’s biggest ally and supporter. The Soviet nostalgia is still very much
so prevalent among older Armenian citizens, however, what is notable is that the new
generation of Armenians is rather pro-Western, and “Putin’s Russia is increasingly perceived to
be hindering democratic processes within Armenia”.187 Some would argue that this is not the
case for all the young people and that is correct -- Armenia’s and Russia’s history goes back for
centuries and most of the younger generation was raised in households that still have close
emotional and cultural ties to Russia. Armenians do believe that they share similar values and
norms with Russia, which is not the case when they think of the European Union. Some
Armenians are worried about losing their culture if Armenia gains closer connections with the
European Union and ‘Independence Generation: Youth study 2016’ showcases this in their data
-- 18.5 percent completely agree, 38.9 percent mostly agree, 32.2 percent mostly disagree and
10.4 percent completely disagree that Strengthening ties with the EU will endanger Armenian
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national-traditional values.188 The sample size and methodology that this study uses has its
flaws which leads me to take their exact data findings with a grain of salt, however, it can help
establish general attitudes. The same study cites a 2014 survey according to which “51 percent
of the population in Armenia think that the country should strengthen its foreign political ties
with both Europe and Russia, 34 percent believe that ties should only be strengthened with
Russia, and just 4 percent believe that ties should only be strengthened with Europe”.189 In both
of the surveys, it is notable that a majority of respondents are more pro-Russian rather than
pro-EU. Nonetheless, contrary to the ‘Independence Generation: Youth study 2016’, ‘Analytical
Center on Globalization and Regional Cooperation’ which conducted surveys in several
Armenian cities and towns, come to a different outcome in their study. This study concludes
that around 59 percent of those who were surveyed connected Armenia’s future to the
European Union, while merely 34 percent considered Russia Armenia’s ally, and 78 percent
gave a negative opinion on Armenia rejecting the Association Agreement with the EU in
2013.190 Caucasus Barometer published a study in 2017 called ‘Public Perceptions on Political,
Social, and Economic Issues in the South Caucasus Countries’ which includes data from 2011 to
2017. One of the questions in the study was “Which country is currently the main friend of
Armenia?” and during all the years the country that was ranked number 1 was Russia. However,
in 2011, 80 percent of those surveyed chose Russia, while in 2012 that number was 79 percent,
in 2013 – 84 percent, in 2015 – 74 percent, and eventually in 2017 the number dropped to 64
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percent.191 This data showcases a clear drop in Armenians’ attitudes and trust towards Russia.
While the first two studies do show relative support towards Russia, there is no information
regarding how that number has changed throughout the years. The last study mentioned does
show a steep decline in the popularity of Russia amongst Armenians during a specific time
period. What is also notable is the fact that a big drop in the data occurred after 2013, when
Armenia joined Eurasian Economic Union and it was at an all-time low in 2017 which is right
before the Velvet Revolution. There can be numerous reasons why Armenians’ have less
sympathy and trust towards Russia -- it can be anything from globalization and changing values
which align better with EU norms and values to distrust towards Russia because of the actions
they took over the years. Stepan Grigoryan, president of ‘Analytical Center on Globalization and
Regional Cooperation’ suggests that The Four Day War between Nagorno Karabakh/Armenia
and Azerbaijan, in April 2016, was the main reason for the Armenian public’s opinion change
regarding Russia: “In Armenia, Russia’s reputation has rather dropped – it sells weapons to
Azerbaijan, we did not receive real support during April War. The authorities tell this as well.
This reality could not skip having consequences. This is the reason why the public is for
alternatives”.192 This can explain the sharp decline in the numbers in 2017.
Russia is heavily involved in Armenia and Armenian politics, so, a question arises -- why
did Russia not step in to stop the Velvet Revolution? Vladimir Putin and Serzh Sargsyan were on
good terms and any disturbance in the Armenian political system can potentially have a
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negative effect on Russian influence both in Armenia and in the region. There is no one correct
answer that will explain Putin’s inactivity -- realistically, it is a mix of different factors.
To begin with, Nikol Pashinyan’s rhetoric during the revolution was mainly focused on
internal issues rather than external ones. He did not side ideologically with either Russia or with
Europe. While Pashinyan has criticized Armenia’s extreme dependency on Russia in the past, he
was rather cautious about not triggering Russia’s fear of the Color Revolutions, and called the
Velvet Revolution “the first mass movement in the post-Soviet space in the last 20 years that is
not associated with any foreign power”.193 The Kremlin on its end spoke positively about the
Velvet Revolution, while Putin’s spokesperson Dmitry Peskov “called the political crisis
‘exclusively an internal affair’ of Armenia and ruled out any Russian interference”.194 The
Kremlin additionally restated several times that they do not draw parallels between the
Ukrainian Orange Revolution and the Armenian Velvet Revolution.195
Another line of argument regarding Russia’s relatively passive approach to the Armenian
revolution is that unlike Ukraine and Georgia, Armenia has never showcased any interest in
becoming a NATO member state.196 Armenia is a member of the Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO), which is a post-Soviet security block. Joining NATO would be incompatible
with Armenia’s membership in CSTO, which is the only South Caucasian member republic of the
organization. Robert Kocharyan, the second president of Armenia, determined that “joining
NATO would affect Armenia’s relations with neighboring countries and would barely improve
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its national security”.197 The decision to even consider joining NATO can potentially hurt
Armenia’s relations with Iran as well. It appears, that Serzh Sargsyan and Nikol Pashinyan hold
the same beliefs as Kocharyan did. On December 10, 2018, Pashinyan said: “We have relations
with NATO, which are linked with peacekeeping missions, including in Kosovo and Afghanistan.
And we will continue this cooperation. But we are not seeking to obtain NATO membership. We
are a member of the CSTO”.198 Another reason why Armenia cannot join NATO is the fact that
Turkey is a NATO member state and “following the closure of the Armenian–Turkish border in
1993, the hypothetical door to NATO membership was shut”.199 Allegedly Turkey portrayed a
negative image of Armenia as “Russia’s ‘puppet’” among other NATO states.200
Another reason for Russia’s non-engagement could have served the scale of protests.
Protests were massive and included people from all walks of life -- young and old people,
students and professionals, people that live in Yerevan and small towns all over Armenia. If
Sargsyan tried to violently break down those protests a massive amount of violence would have
been required. Additionally, Armenia has a diaspora of 10 million, which increasingly got more
disapproving of Sargsyan’s politics and policies throughout the years. By the end of Sargsyan’s
rule, he was highly unpopular, and Russia simply did not want to be associated with a Prime
Minister whose reputation is extremely damaged and who used such a massive force and
violence to stay in power. Anahit Shirinyan explains: “Russia’s calculus was clearly based on its
unwillingness to support an unpopular government and further damage its image in the eyes of
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Armenian society. Had it interfered; this could have turned the massive display of ‘people
power’ against Moscow”.201
There can be many other possible explanations for why Russia decided not to interfere
in Armenia, which is a rather unprecedented move, considering Russia’s intervention during
other Color Revolutions. Another line of argument emphasizes the fact that in the other cases
of Color Revolution -- especially in Georgia and Ukraine -- the West and the US had a relatively
strong presence on the ground, which was not the case in Armenia. If Russia interfered with the
revolution that could have provoked a reaction from the West, which would have not been a
favorable outcome for Russia.202 Additionally, it can be argued that “any heavy-handed Russian
response would have likely harmed Russia’s standing within Armenia and triggered greater
instability,”203 which would have not been an ideal outcome as Armenia does have significance
for Russia.
The safest hypothesis would be that Russia was convinced that Pashinyan would
continue having strong ties to Russia and would not cross the line with Armenia’s involvement
with the European Union. Some analysts believe that Serzh Sargsyan resigned because the
Kremlin gave him the ‘green light’ to do so, as well as the Kremlin ‘allowed’ Pashinyan to
become the new Prime Minister of Armenia.204
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Chapter 3: Internal Factors that Caused the Velvet Revolution

The Velvet Revolution emanated largely due to discontent at the previous government
and internal hardships of the country and population, which led to the revolution having a
strong domestic focus.205 This chapter explores domestic factors that led to the emergence of
the Velvet Revolution in Armenia. The factors explored, are the ones that came up in almost all
successful and failed cases of Color Revolutions. However, the factors chosen were also highly
important in the context of Armenia, as they have proven to be some of the most pressing
issues that the citizens of Armenia have faced and still face today. The factors discussed in this
Chapter are fraudulent elections, poor living conditions, oligarchy, and dissatisfied youth. Many
of these factors are interrelated and in combination create an atmosphere of anger and antigovernment/ruling elite sentiments. Additionally, all those factors create a web of issues that is
extremely hard to tackle as the systems that were in place had been so since the emergence of
the new Republic of Armenia in 1991. Grievances that people faced made them keen to protest
and demand a better life, especially when thousands of people were doing so.

Electoral Fraud in Armenia
Electoral fraud is one of the main factors that can lead to the emergence of a Color
Revolution. Literature related to this topic states over and over the importance of this factor as
all the Color Revolution cases emerged after a fraudulent election (be that presidential or
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parliamentary election). Chapter 1 demonstrated this -- in the cases of Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine,
and Kyrgyzstan, people took over the streets and protests became much more intense after
elections -- which according to the people were unjust -- took place. Electoral fraud itself might
not cause a huge uproar; however, accompanied by other societal issues and unhappiness
towards the existing government, victory of the same party or individual can become the last
necessary piece for starting a revolution.
In September 1991, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Armenia experienced
relatively free elections (high participation rates, no severe violations at the polls). However,
that was the first and last time in the history of the new republic when elections were just. In
1996, Levon Ter-Petrossian was re-elected. Nonetheless, at this time, his re-election was a
result of manipulation by security forces.206 In 1998, after the resignation of Ter-Petrossian,
Robert Kocharian was elected as president. Those elections were recognized as “neither free
nor fair”207 by the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The rule and
regime that Kocharian established remained dominant in Armenia until the 2018 Velvet
Revolution. This is a key component in analyzing failed cases of Color Revolutions in Armenia in
2003/2004 and 2008, as well as the Velvet Revolution in 2018 because those networks that
Kocharyan created gave rise to most of the issues that galvanized people to go out to the
streets and protest.
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Kocharyan had a stronghold over the military and security forces that favored his
regime. Furthermore, his network of relatives and friends controlled most of the country’s
economy. In 2003, when it was time for Kocharian to get re-elected, “the regime used
widespread fraud, as well as intimidation of and violence against the opposition.”208 Similarly, in
2008, Kocharian’s chosen successor, Serj Sargsyan, was elected in another highly fraudulent
election. There was no hope towards fair elections amongst Armenians: “public opinion polls in
August 2006 and January 2008, funded by USAID and sponsored by IRI, found that few
Armenians believed that the elections would be free and fair.”209 The OSCE recognized that in
2008, elections were neither fair nor free and many reports of electoral frauds were received.
For example, the chairman of the polling station 9/31 in Yerevan had been arrested on
suspicions of falsifying voting results. The chairman of the commission, Eduard Aghajanyan, his
deputy, commission secretary, and commission members “included obviously false and
distorted data in the protocol on the results of voting and confirmed it with their signatures.”210
This is just one example of electoral fraud, however many more of those occur during any given
election in Armenia.
In 2015, then president Serzh Sargsyan proposed a constitutional change, the main
effect of which would be changing Armenia’s existing Semi-Presidential system to the
Parliamentary Republic. On October 8, the National Assembly voted to put the proposal to a
vote. The referendum took place on December 6 -- turnout was minimal (51 percent) and the
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changes were passed with 66 percent of the vote.211 This referendum and its passing were
highly controversial as it was widely believed that this whole constitutional change was a
loophole for Sargsyan to stay in power for even longer after his second 4-year term as a
president was coming to an end. An OSCE report about this referendum stated that the election
was “tainted by credible information about vote-buying, and pressure on civil servants and
employees of private companies to vote for the ruling party.”212
An ongoing source of electoral fraud in Armenia is the passive voter registration system
based on the state population register maintained by the police. This means that citizens of
Armenia do not need to register before elections to take part in them, as all the electoral lists
are organized by the police. While it is argued by the police that they put effort into trying to
make the voter lists as accurate as possible, voter lists every year include “an unduly high
number of registrations at some addresses and deceased people”.213 This was the case during
the 2015 referendum. Also, those voter lists included names of people who, during the time of
the referendum, were living abroad and would not be able to participate in elections. A
survey carried out by the Compass Research Centre (Gyumri-based research center) found a
surplus of 845 voters at a polling station in one of the villages’ in the Kotayk region during the
2015 Constitutional Referendum.214 Other findings of electoral fraud include 218 ‘citizens’
sharing the same first and last names and dates of birth, while 37,339 ‘citizens’ dates of birth
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were nowhere to be found.215 Compass researcher Karen Petrosyan also found great
inconsistencies in voter lists for Gyumri (the second-largest city in Armenia): three in ten
presented addresses on the polling lists did not exist at all while in case of addresses that did
exist, three in ten registered citizens age 80 and over were dead by the time of the
referendum.216 During the same election, at polling stations, OSCE observed the vote-counting
process during which “serious problems included interference and intimidation by proxies of
supporters of the ‘Yes’ campaign leading to alteration of the actual vote results”217 (the ‘Yes’
campaign was in support of president Sargsyan and of Armenia becoming a Parliamentary
Republic). Citizen observers, opposition groups, and media reported allegations of widespread
irregularities, interference, and intimidation in the voting and counting process throughout the
country.218 While those findings sound shocking and unreal, this is rather standard for elections
in Armenia. These kinds of irregularities make people upset and cause their faith in the
government to waiver – people do not feel represented by ‘elected’ officials and do not believe
that they will act on behalf of regular citizens’ interests. This kind of mass dissatisfaction is
another push for these people to take matters into their own hands and take over the streets to
make a change.
There is no one explanation of why fraudulent elections lead to the emergence of social
movements and specifically Color Revolutions. However, as it was demonstrated in Chapter 1,
this is a key element when it comes to mobilization of the population. This was one of the main,
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constant factors that was present during all the successful and failed cases of Color Revolutions.
Beachain and Polese note that “elections are considered propitious occasions to inspire
protesters, partially because they sometimes provide a rare opportunity to mobilize and
demonstrate with relative impunity, as international observers are usually present”.219 Joshua
Tucker220 has his own explanation of why Color Revolutions emerge after fraudulent elections -when people have strong grievances against the government, addressing them can have high
costs and low chances of success. So, citizens decide not to move forward with addressing
those grievances. Electoral fraud, however, changes those calculations drastically and
encourages citizens to protest because if electoral fraud happened, then challenging it can
mean a full change of government. Thus, the outcome of protests, if successful, can be very
valuable. As presented above, in all the cases of successful Color Revolutions, the old regime
was overthrown and the opposition leader became the new president such that the
overarching and valuable goal was achieved.
The next subsection of this Chapter will touch upon Oligarchy as it is another important
factor in determining why people would be willing to demonstrate and go against the
government and power. In post-Soviet spaces, oligarchy plays a central role in the government,
economy and retains extensive control over almost any aspect of life in a given country.
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Oligarchy
In the 1990s, Armenia went through a series of transformations and challenges: the
dissolution of the Soviet Union, declaration of independence, and last but not least, the war in
Nagorno Karabakh with Azerbaijan. In May 1990, during Parliamentary elections, the Armenian
National Movement (ANM) Party came to power. This was a time when Armenia was going
through the most difficult period of the planned economy’s collapse: the country was suffering
from a shortage of goods, blockade of land transport, and Soviet Prime Minister Valentin
Pavlov’s confiscatory money reform221. This unstable situation, where people on top had
leeways to accumulate huge amounts of wealth by selling arms during the Nagorno Karabakh
war or simply stealing from the government, led to the creation of oligarchy in the 1990s and
2000s. This transitional situation, when everything collapsed and was supposed to be built
almost from the scratch, allowed people to surpass the law, carry out illegal endeavors and
allowed a small subset of the population to collect huge amounts of wealth in a very short
span. These events had a long-lasting impact and heavily shaped Armenia’s future both
economically and politically, and eventually resulted in the emergence of the Velvet Revolution
in 2018.
The term ‘oligarchy’ stems from the Greek word ὀλιγαρχία which is composed of ὀλίγος
(oligoi, “few”) and αρχία (arkhein, “to rule”)222 – the rule of the few. However, this definition is
rather broad and does not provide a full understanding of the concept. There is no one
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definition of oligarchy is and it is rather difficult to define the scope of it. How much power
(“rule”) should that “few” have to be considered an oligarch?
Different political scientists have different understandings of what oligarchy is.
However, for this thesis, a more general understanding of oligarchy will be considered -specifically, one established by American political scientist Jeffrey A. Winters in his book
Oligarchy223. Winters defines oligarchs as those who keep large material resources under their
control, through which they protect or enhance their wealth and social position.224
Nonetheless, it is important to also consider the geographic location of the country when
speaking about oligarchy there. Oligarchy in Armenia should be considered and understood
through a post-Soviet lens, as the influence of the Soviet Union was and still is prevailing in
Armenia. In the post-Soviet space, “the word ‘oligarch’ is primarily used in reference to wealthy
people (mainly the dollar billionaires) who have good relations with the president.”225 Oligarchs
in Armenia are individuals who hold exceptional financial power (especially compared to most
of the Armenian population) and quite often a monopoly of power over a particular economic
sphere.226
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the war in Nagorno Karabakh created
opportunities for corrupt individuals to accumulate large amounts of wealth, privatize and
create monopolies over different spheres. Armenia lacks both natural resources (especially oil
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and gas)227 and a developed land transport infrastructure (two out of four borders with
neighboring countries are closed)228. During the Soviet-era, Armenia’s manufacturing sector,
which comprised the vast majority of the economy, was closely tied to the Russian economy
such that factories would produce one specific part which would later be shipped to Russia for
assembly. This meant that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, all the existing factories closed
and many people were left without job opportunities as Armenia itself was not capable to
support all those industries itself. It might seem that this kind of economic situation would not
allow for the creation of oligarchic structures. However, “oligarchy in Armenia formed through
connections with the existing geopolitical situation, particularly, the Nagorno Karabakh war and
to the blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan.”229 Oligarchic structures started developing around
exports and imports; especially during wartime, huge monetary streams passed through
different power structures of Armenia – the Ministry of Defense, the Ministry of Home Affairs,
and state agencies that controlled the transportation (both on land as well as Zvartnots
International Airport).230 Due to limitations imposed by the blockade by Turkey and Azerbaijan,
a key group of people, supported by those ministries (usually based on personal relationships
with those individuals) took monopolistic control over the most important shipping routes, as
the blockade left a very limited number of shipment routes available to Armenia.
The rapid rate of privatization after the collapse of the Soviet Union concentrated
almost the entirety of Armenia’s national wealth within the hands of 45–50 families that
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controlled 54–70 percent of the country’s national wealth.231 In 2007, former prime minister
Hrant Bagratyan estimated that 55 percent of Armenia's GDP is controlled by 44 families (this
number potentially is smaller as many of those families are related to each other).232 To put this
in context, during the same period, in Russia, 40 families controlled 16 percent of GDP and in
the United States, 400 families controlled 10 percent.233
When Robert Kocharyan was elected in 1998, it became apparent that one of his main
priorities was to “take an active part in the economic and financial processes in the country
through his men”.234 During Kocharyan’s presidency, the creation of favorable conditions for
medium and small businesses was slowed down and later, essentially blocked. Kocharyan’s clan
and friends quickly started to privatize big enterprises (for example, the mining industry), and
“the government started to take part in the privatization and large-scale commercial
transactions.”235 Many political scientists and researchers such as Gayane Shaghoyan believe
that Armenia is a country ruled by oligarchs and that those tight-knit oligarchic ‘clans’ have
great control over politics; those ‘clans’ became the main political unit that held all the
power.236 Proof of this is the election of Serzh Sargsyan in 2008: he had a close alliance with and
connections to Robert Kocharyan and his ‘clan’, and Sargsyan’s ‘clan’ had rule over different
parts of the economy including alcohol and tobacco. However, a differentiating factor of
Sargsyan’s ‘clan’ was the massive investments they made in politics and media: “90 percent of
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Armenian mass-media was controlled by the president’s [Sargsyan’s] son-in-law, Mikayel
Minasyan.”237 Furthermore, this control meant that there existed a monopoly in the market of
advertising, with full control of the main “public” TV channel H1 by the government.
One of the biggest monopolies in Armenia is the market of sugar that is fully controlled
by Salex Group enterprise, belonging to businessman and oligarch Samvel Aleksanyan.238 While
official sources state that at least 22 other enterprises are involved in the sugar industry, the
numbers show it all: in 2007, 61,544 tons of sugar were imported to Armenia, 58,000 tons of
which were imported by Samvel Alexanyan from Brazil.239 This makes Alexanyan’s share in the
sugar industry 95 percent – a clear monopoly. Other than the sugar industry, Fleetfood, another
company belonging to Alexanyan, dominates the import of butter and ethanol.240 Aleksanyan is
also the owner of numerous businesses, the main one being a network of supermarkets called
Yerevan City that can be found all over Armenia. This supermarket network took the business
from many small and medium-sized businesses and grocery stores, which further created
hardships for smaller businessmen. Aleksanyan was also a member of The Republican Party of
Armenia (RPA), led by ex-president Serzh Sargsyan and during his short-term as prime minister,
Alexanyan held a seat in National Assembly. Another example can be seen in the cement
industry that is controlled by two monopolist businessmen, Gagik Tsarukyan and Mikael
Baghdasarov.241 While having a monopoly over a certain industry or product is not unlawful,
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the government suppressing active participation in the economy by medium or small
businesses (be that by intimidation or creation of unfavorable business opportunities) is against
the law.
There has not been much research conducted on Armenian oligarchy. However, few
available sources (e.g. Nelson Shahnazaryan’s 2012 book The Meaning and Strategies of a
Nation’s Development) argue that these oligarchs have no long-term vision and sense of
responsibility for the country’s future.242 Shahnazaryan further argues that “oligarchic
businesses are short-termed, based on continually renewed oral agreements (which increases
their chaotic nature and makes it impossible to work out a long-term strategy), have a cartel
character and are attached to the political system, especially at the higher levels of
government.”243 Many of those oligarchs, due to their close relations with the ruling elite, or
their status as members of the ruling elite themselves take advantage of tax loopholes, illegal
business advances, and close-knit connections with each other. This imposes a threat to the
country’s stability and economic development. Monopolies in different industries result in high
prices (even on basic commodities like sugar and butter) that make the burden on regular
citizens even heavier, especially in a country like Armenia that suffers from high unemployment
and poverty rates.
Anders Åslund argues that “for the very rich, politics is foremost a means to further
their business interests.”244 In Armenia, the line between business and politics is rather blurry:
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in 2007 “at least 25 of Armenia’s 131 Members of Parliament are businessmen or are known to
own a controlling stake in lucrative businesses.”245 In 2009, the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) assessed that the Armenian economy is entering a new phase of ‘zero-growth’.246 This
means that Armenia will face “declining revenue, dwindling investment and an end to even the
mirage of economic growth that the previous government so effectively used to hide its
political shortcomings.”247 For oligarchs, their main priority is not the benefit of the country, but
rather the defense and multiplication of the wealth they own. Armenia, and its citizens’ benefit
and prosperity is not the main priority of these oligarch-politicians.
The situation in Armenia is not unusual for the region and specifically for countries that
went through either successful or failed attempts of Color Revolutions. In Azerbaijan, oligarchy
and ‘clan’ relations were formed around many industries, specifically the oil industry by the
Aliev clan. In Georgia, during Shevardnadze's presidency, oligarchic structures were formed
around different businesses and the transit industry. Similarly, Russian politics and economy are
greatly influenced by oligarchs like Boris Berezovsky, Mikhail Prokhorov, and Roman
Abramovich as well as the Armenian oligarch in Russia, Samvel Karapetyan. While researching
cases and attempts of Color Revolutions in these countries, the literature finds that Oligarchy
and people’s anger towards these structures played a huge role in the emergence of
nationwide movements (more about this in Chapter 1). Hence, this further validates the
argument that Oligarchy did have a role in the emergence of the Velvet Revolution.
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Oligarchy advances material inequality that creates political inequality248 - the power of
an individual is determined by their financial situation and oligarchs are on the top of that
hierarchy. While, in Armenia, most of the oligarchs had close ties with the ruling party,
theoretically if one has money, their problems can be resolved regardless of their party
affiliation. After the Velvet Revolution, while some oligarchs were investigated and were taken
into custody for a few hours, all actions against them were a light slap on a wrist rather than
something with serious consequences. This further proves that the oligarchy, to some extent,
has power over the government, which makes them feel untouchable.
Oligarchy is a structure that is deeply rooted in current Armenian society and politics.
On October 18, 2018, prime minister Nikol Pashinyan during one of his rally’s announced that
there are no more oligarchs in Armenia. This created huge uproar and dissatisfaction as one of
the richest men and oligarchs in Armenia, Gagik Tsarukyan, still holds considerable power in
Armenia. He is the president of the National Olympic Committee, and his Prosperous Armenia
Party (PAP) is the second-largest party in the Parliament with 26 seats. American-Armenian
historian and political scientist Simon Payaslian calls Tsarukyan “the richest and most famous
member of the ruling oligarchy in Armenia.”249 Tsarukyan made most of his capital under
Kocharyan’s presidency and was one of his biggest business partners. Tsarukyan has business
interests in gas stations, the agrarian sector, food, alcohol, construction materials, and is also
an exporter.250 Tsarukyan also owns large-scale businesses in Eastern Europe, the Middle East,
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and former Soviet countries.251 US Ambassador to Armenia John Evans, in WikiLeaks’
declassified secret document in 2006, described Tsarukyan as an “influential oligarch with
business interest in various fields.”252
On the next day, October 19, Pashinyan tried to elaborate on his previous statement
and clarify what he meant: “I am saying that the power of the few in Armenia has collapsed and
that the people’s power, meaning your power, has been established. This doesn’t mean that
the people who were formerly called oligarchs ceased to exist, but it is their status that has
ceased to exist. This is the reason that I say – there is no oligarchy in Armenia, the power of the
many, the people’s power is established in Armenia.”253
It is important to understand that this oligarchic structure affects every aspect of life in
Armenia. In many instances, oligarchs are able to make decisions that will serve their wants and
needs without considering the situation in Armenia and what is best for the Armenian people.
Poverty rates are extremely high in Armenia; however, these oligarchs are able to go on luxury
vacations, own summer houses on beaches, accumulate massive amounts of wealth, and own
many businesses. It is therefore unsurprising that people will get angry about this inequality
and unfairness. Much research has been done in this regard, and it was found that in general,
governments listen to the rich more than to the poor.254 Yet, in a country like Armenia, where
most of the wealth is in the hands of one small subgroup of people, the government is fully
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ruled and controlled by them. Armenia has a rather strong tradition of demonstrations and
protests and this issue came up more than once during different movements and protests.
This kind of Oligarchic structure and economic inequality leads to poor living conditions - a topic that will be explored in the next subsection.

Poor Living Conditions in Armenia
As has been discussed earlier, poor living conditions (high poverty rates, unemployment,
a weak welfare state, etc.) can be a reason behind the emergence of civil unrest all around the
world and especially in countries where Color Revolutions took place. As a newly independent
country, Armenia is still battling the outcomes of the Soviet Union’s collapse, because of which
many factories were closed, and industries and workplaces disappeared. The Global Economic
Crisis of 2009 hit Armenia dramatically and “the drastic decline of the economy of Armenia was
followed by a sharp rise in poverty”.255 While starting from 2010 the level of poverty was
decreasing, in 2014, still 30 percent of Armenians lived below the poverty line, which meant
that every three Armenians out of ten lived in a household where the income was less than
40,264 AMD/month (around 80 USD).256 The poverty rate saw a steady decrease: in 2017, such
that 25.7 percent257 of the population lived below the national poverty line.
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There are different layers to poverty and to differentiate between them, the World Bank
divides people who live in poverty into three different groups: the poor, the very poor, and the
extremely poor. The poor are defined as those with consumption per adult equivalent to or
below the upper total poverty line; the very poor are defined as those with consumption per
adult equivalent to or below the lower total poverty line, whereas the extremely poor or the
undernourished are defined as those with consumption per adult equivalent below the food
poverty line.258 In 2014, Armenia’s population was around 2,912,000, and out of that, 900,000
were poor, 330,000 very poor, and 70,000 extremely poor.259
In 2014, poverty rates in Armenia were fairly similar both in urban (30 percent) and rural
(29.9 percent) areas.260 Yerevan, the capital city, had the lowest poverty rate in the country -25.2 percent.261 This difference between Yerevan and other cities, big or small, is easily
observable: Yerevan hosts all the Governmental Offices, Non-Governmental Organizations,
Institutes, and other offices and organizations, while other cities lack any of that activity, which
increases the unemployment rates in those cities as well as decreases job opportunities. In
2014, 63.6 percent of the poor, 13.6 percent of the very poor, and 67.9 percent of the
extremely poor were urban residents. However, Yerevan had the lowest percentage of the very
poor – 9 percent.262 The reported unemployment rate in Armenia is 16 percent, although it is
estimated that the true number is around 30 percent.263 The welfare system in Armenia, when
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it comes to unemployment benefits, is minimal, and so a large percentage of unemployed
people decide not to go through the process of filing paperwork and do not get registered. The
average job search duration is 20 months, and in cities other than Yerevan it can be much
longer. Currently, one-fourth of jobs in Armenia are low-paying jobs; the Armenian labor
market is strongly lacking middle-income positions. Salaries in Armenia are extremely low and
positions that would have paid well are still dramatically underpaid here – “the proportion of
employed population below $1.90 purchasing power parity/day in 2017 is 1.4 percent.”264 The
average monthly salary in Armenia is 55,000 Armenian Dram, which is roughly 115 USD.265
While the cost of living in Armenia is not as high as in other more developed countries, 115 USD
is not enough to live in Armenia, especially in Yerevan. This led to a huge migration of
population elsewhere: around 14 percent of Armenians found employment overseas.266 Over
the last 4 years, the population in Armenia decreased by 6 percent and a big part of that
decrease was due to high migration rates.267 78 percent of migrants are males and 22 percent
are females,268 which further shows that a lot of migration is due to lack of employment in
Armenia as it is mainly males who migrate for work-related issues. The main migration
destination is Russia, because of visa-free entry and comparably easy steps that need to be
taken to be formally employed there. However, some also migrate to Eastern Europe, postSoviet Baltic States, the United States and the Middle East. In 2017, due to migration, the
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population declined by 2002;269 this number means that in 2002 more people left Armenia
permanently to settle in another country than people who returned to Armenia or moved to
Armenia permanently.
In 1988, a devastating earthquake occurred in the city of Gyumri that took 25,000 lives.
While more than 30 years have passed, some parts of Gyumri still look like an image from 1988
and it seems like life has stopped there. Many people who were left homeless because of that
earthquake still do not have their own homes and live in dorms or single rooms. Many
buildings, especially outside of Yerevan, do not have heating or cooling systems, so residents
rely on burning wood as their source of heat. The overwhelming majority of apartment
buildings (over 50 percent), specifically outside of Yerevan, are due for renovations that will
make them more earthquake resistant and energy-efficient.270 This further shows how big the
divide is between the rich and poor in Armenia – while Oligarchs enjoy their mansions, some
people do not have heating during the winter and have not been able to get a house 30 years
after the 1988 earthquake.
Low living standards, low salaries, high poverty rates, and a weak welfare state – all of
these are important reasons that can lead to people uprising. These are issues that directly
affect people’s lives. When looking at different interviews with protestors during the Velvet
Revolution those are themes that come out very often and are of central importance for
protestors. The next subsection focuses on similar issues, but it specifically looks into struggles
that young people face, as they were the leading force of the Velvet Revolution.
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Dissatisfied Youth
The Velvet Revolution, as any other Color Revolution, was led and organized by the
youth – high school students, university students, young professionals. Everyone had their fair
share in this movement. Chapter 1 explored Youth Movements in Serbia, Ukraine, Georgia, and
other countries where Color Revolutions took place and it is very clear that youth movements
had a lot to do with the success of the civil uprising and mobilization. In all those countries,
young people had initial grievances that became catalysts for them to get to the streets and
organize. In Armenia, the youth face many different issues. However, the most relevant one for
this movement is the fact that finding employment and self-development opportunities in
Armenia is rather hard and young people constantly feel the need to emigrate to Europe or the
United States to have good prospects for the future. Because of corruption and oligarchy, many
people cannot get into positions that they deserve to be in just because they do not have
relatives or people they know, and/or enough money for bribes to get accepted into those
positions. Young people, fairly so, feel like the troubles they are facing are the fault of the
government and oligarchy. Ms. Petrosyan, one of the participants of protests during the Velvet
Revolution, said: “Our government is outdated and that we needed to change it.”271
According to data from the Statistical Committee of the Republic of Armenia, the
employment rate of youth, aged 15-29, is 33.5 percent, while the unemployment rate is 30
percent.272 The rest of the youth is considered economically inactive which means they are not
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employed. However, they are not actively seeking employment either (36.5 percent). Most of
the economically inactive population is female, as in Armenia, culturally, the woman is the one
who takes care of the household chores and children. Therefore, even after higher education
females are the ones who stay at home and do not use their degrees. “The highest
unemployment rate is reported among youth aged 20-24 years-old.”273 While finding a job is
not an easy task in Armenia, one’s chances are getting even slimmer based on where they
reside – “the smaller the place of permanent residence, the more likely it is to become
unemployed.”274 According to the responses to Youth-focused and Gender-sensitive Labour
Market Research in Armenia, conducted by Media-Model LLC in 2018, “two in five young
unemployed respondents have been looking for work for more than one year.”275 Young people
in bigger cities applied and got rejected from jobs at a higher rate than youth living in smaller
cities and villages. This is simply connected to the lack of workplaces and opportunities in rural
locations. Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, has the biggest number of opportunities available,
while even Gyumri, the second-largest city of Armenia, does not have even half of what
Yerevan has to offer.
One of the biggest issues for employed youth is dissatisfaction regarding their
educational degree/professional capabilities and the job they have.276 It is not uncommon to
see young people with an undergraduate level of education working in the service industry or
having extremely low-paid positions. Another big issue that young people face is a “lack of
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potential in professional and career growth.”277 This might be an even bigger concern for the
youth because it is not unusual worldwide for recent graduates to work low paid jobs entry jobs
or have a temporary or part-time job in a different industry from what they have studied.
However, not having possibilities in the future for growth, development and a well-paid
position is an important concern and issue that leads to high numbers of migration from
Armenia, especially for Armenian youth. Half of the respondents of Youth-focused and Gendersensitive Labour Market Research in Armenia expressed a desire to change their workplace
because of dissatisfaction with it.278 “Only around a half of young workers are in occupations
that match their level of education (53.7 percent) compared to workers who work in
occupations for which they are overeducated (33.6 percent) or undereducated (12.7
percent).”279
The 4-day war between Armenia and Azerbaijan for Nagorno Karabakh further
deepened dissatisfaction with the government, especially among the youth. Armenians kept
hearing over and over how poor living conditions, a weak welfare state, and lack of investments
in different sectors is a necessary sacrifice to have a strong army. However, once the war
erupted, news started circulating that “soldiers lacked basic items like bullets and medical
kits.”280 It became even more evident how much money and resources were stolen by the
government and oligarchy – “The government ate everything that was supposed to be used to
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supply the army”281 said 24-year-old Samvel Mkrtchyan, another participant in the Velvet
Revolution.
As already mentioned, dissatisfied youth played a big role in all the cases of Color
Revolutions. In recent years, the Armenian youth have been especially active politically -Electric Yerevan, Dem Em, 100 Dram, Mashtots Purak are all movements that were organized
by the youth regarding different issues that Armenia was facing. The scope of those protests
was wide: Electric Yerevan was a movement against an increase in electricity prices, 100 Dram
was about an increase in public transport prices. Mashtots Purak was about preserving a public
park from becoming a shopping center. The youth was active in different spheres. When it
came to the Velvet Revolution, young people saw it as the perfect opportunity to change the
government in hopes that their future will become more prosperous and secure under the
leadership of Nikol Pashinyan.
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Chapter 4: Post-Velvet Revolution Armenia

After Serzh Sargsyan stepped down, Karen Karapetyan became the acting Prime
Minister of Armenia. He was the Mayor of Yerevan from 2010 to 2011 after which from
September 2016 to April 2018 he served as a Prime Minister and was succeeded by Serzh
Sargsyan. He was also a long-standing Gazprom official, holding senior executive positions,
which gave Russia some degree of comfort after Sargsyan’s resignation, as through having
leadership roles in Gazprom, Karapetyan enjoyed the backing of the Kremlin. 282 Pashinyan was
extremely unhappy with the choice of the acting Prime Minister who was a member of the
Republican Party. He demanded the ruling Republican Party of Armenia (HHK) to renounce its
power following the resignation of Sargsyan. Pashinyan announced: “The HHK and [acting
Prime Minister] Karen Karapetian are trying to wrest the victory from the people. We will not
allow that”.283 Pashinyan once again took over the streets while being supported by his
followers. This uproar began right after Pashinyan’s and Karapetyan’s scheduled meeting got
canceled due to Karapetyan rejecting preconditions set by Pashinyan.284 Pashinyan’s key
demands were to appoint ‘people’s candidate’, that is Pashinyan himself, as in interim Prime
Minister as well as to hold snap parliamentary elections.285 Karapetyan told journalists that
while he is not opposed to holding a snap election, he believes that “their date and modalities
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must be agreed by Armenia’s leading political forces by consensus”.286 Pashinyan’s response to
this was the same as always: mobilizing his followers and taking over the streets.
On May 2, 2018, Pashinyan was the only candidate running for the role of the Armenian
Prime Minister as the Republican Party of Armenia did not put forward a candidate of their
own. However, Pashinyan was unable to secure the necessary number of votes in the
Parliament to become the new Prime Minister. Out of 105 National Assembly members, only 45
voted for Pashinyan when he needed at least 53 votes for victory.287 Pashinyan was able to
secure all the votes from Yelk Alliance (Pahinyan’s party) that had 9 seats, The Tsarukian
Alliance with 31 seats, and all but one vote from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation
(Dashnaktsutyun) with 7 seats.288 However, the Republican Party of Armenia, which held the
majority of the seats (58 seats) in the National Assembly, did not vote for him. Only one of the
Republican Party deputies, Felix Tsolakian, voted for him.
After this defeat, Pashinyan once again called upon his followers to take over the
streets, blockade key transport routes, for students to protest by skipping classes and joining
demonstrations instead. Pashinyan described his defeat as an ‘insult to the people’ and urged
the Republican Party to “Get sober [before] it's too late, because your behavior could cause a
political tsunami”.289 Pashinyan knew that his biggest strengths are his followers and people’s
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almost blind trust in him, so he knew that this would be the best way to demonstrate his
power.
According to Armenia’s Constitution, when the Parliament is unable to choose a Prime
Minister during the first meeting, the second round of vote should take place in a week. If the
Parliament fails to appoint a Prime Minister, it should be automatically dissolved, and new
elections should be called.290 On May 8 Parliamentary voting Pashinyan got elected as a Prime
Minister in a 59 to 42 vote.291 Thousands of his supporters, at the Republic Square, were is
ecstasy. Pashinyan said: “I am in a working mood, there is no sense of euphoria, just work to
do. If we were able to do the impossible, that means we will be able to do the difficult”.292
After being elected as a Prime Minister, Pashinyan had five days to choose cabinet
members and 15 to submit his government program to Parliament for approval.293 However, it
will be hard for Pashinyan to pass any legislation that the Republican Party disagrees with
because they still hold the majority of the seats in the Parliament. Additionally, the Republican
Party still holds the power to block Pashinyan’s proposed cabinet and/or his government
program.294
Pashinyan was indeed in a ‘work mode’. He took over the office with storm -- different
highly placed officials lost their positions and new ones took those over. For example, on May
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10, only two days after Pashinyan’s appointment, the President of Armenia, Armen Sargsyan,
dismissed the Chief of Police of the Republic of Armenia Vladimir Gasparyan and the Director of
the National Security Service of the Republic of Armenia Georgy Kutoyan, due to Pashinyan’s
recommendations.295 The next 12 months and even more were filled with dismissals,
resignations, arrests, and new appointments. It is not in the scope of this project to conduct a
deep dive into those political events as that can be a project in itself, however, it is important to
mention that almost all of the key governmental positions underwent leadership changes at
least once if not multiple times in a span of months. Pashinyan largely was enjoying people’s
approval, especially at the beginning of his governance, however that does not mean that there
were not people who were unhappy by the changes that he was making. As early as on May 17,
few different groups were taking over the streets once again, but this time they were protesting
against Pashinyan and his orders, not with him. Pashinyan, in his usual manner, went on
Facebook Live and encouraged protestors to be patient with the government.296 He further said
that he took over the streets as he and his followers did not believe that Armenia has a
responsive government, however, the situation is different now.297
City Council elections in Yerevan, on September 23, 2018, were the first major test of
Pashinyan’s and his Party’s political strength. This election was triggered by, Yerevan’s thenmayor, Taron Margaryan’s resignation on July 9, after holding that position since 2011.298
Although Margaryan did not specify the reasons for his resignation, from May 2018 to July 2018
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numerous calls were made urging him to resign. Pashinyan’s My Step block received 81 percent
of the votes, followed by Gagik Tsarukian’s Prosperous Armenia Party (BHK) and the Luys
Alliance, which got 7 percent and 5 percent of votes respectively.299 The Central Electoral
Commission announced that “of the 848,343 eligible voters in Yerevan, 370,323 voted in the
Yerevan City Council elections on September 23, or 43.65 percent”.300 In comparison, the voter
turnout during May 2017 Municipal Elections was 40.99 percent.301 According to Armenia's
Electoral Code, these three forces will become the new City Council -- Prosperous Armenia
Party with five mandates, Luys Alliance with three mandates, and My Step Party Alliance with
57 mandates.302 This allowed My Step Alliance to secure their candidate, Hayk Marutyan, as the
City Mayor. Though Marutyan graduated from the Yerevan State Engineering University, he
made a name for himself as an actor, comedian and screenwriter. He became politically active
during the 2013 demonstrations against the public transportation fare increase and was
relatively vocal in his criticism of Sargsyan’s cabinet. However, he became particularly politically
active during the Velvet Revolution, when he was one of the first supporters of Pashinyan. This
appointment was faced with the criticism of many, as people decided that due to his
background, Marutyan is not fit for the position.
The biggest challenge that Pashinyan and his cabinet were facing was the fact that they
were a Parliamentary minority. To achieve his goal of Snap Parliamentary elections, Pashinyan
resigned from the role of Prime Minister in mid-October 2018. He was successful in convincing
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his opponents not to nominate a candidate for the role of the Prime Minister, the outcome of
which, according to Armenian Constitution, is snap elections. This was a very calculated move
as Pashinyan was entirely sure that My Step Alliance would win the majority of the seats, and
he would be elected as Prime Minister again.
Pashinyan’s calculations were correct -- My Step Alliance block received 70.4 percent of
the votes on December 9, 2018 snap elections.303 The Prosperous Armenia Party won 8.3
percent of the votes while the Bright Armenia Party was in third place with 6.4 percent.304 The
former ruling Republican Party of Armenia received only 4.7 percent of the votes which did not
secure them a spot in the Parliament because according to the Constitution party needs to
receive at least 5 percent of the votes to enter the Parliament.305 Additionally, according to the
Constitution, 30 percent of seats in the Parliament should go to the opposition parties, which
left My Step Alliance with 88 seats out of 132, Prosperous Armenia with 26 seats, and Bright
Armenia with 18 seats.306 Now Pashinyan had a majority in the Parliament and he could easily
pass legislations.
Pashinyan was criticized for calling snap Parliamentary elections as he did not give
Parliament a chance to reform electoral laws, however, it seems like this did not specifically
bother neither Russia nor the EU.307 The factor of Russia is specifically important, as Armenia is
highly dependent on the Kremlin and Putin. While analysts have argued that Pashinyan
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followed all the rules not to trigger a negative response from Russia, it is still rather surprising
that Russia did not question the constitutional legality of the regime change as they did in
Ukraine.308 After Pashinyan’s initial victory on May 8, 2018, Putin congratulated Pashinyan
hoping that cooperation between the two countries will: “promote stronger, friendly, and allied
relations between our countries and partnership within the framework of the Commonwealth
of Independent States, the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization”.309 Pashinyan was known to the Kremlin as a political opposition member during
Serzh Sargsyan’s presidency and an avid opponent of the Eurasian Economic Union, hence
Pashinyan from the get-go felt the need to ensure the Kremlin that Armenia will remain in the
Union and no shifts will occur in Armenia’s geopolitics and strategic orientation.310
While Pashinyan enjoys the widespread approval of his supporters, there are many
questions yet to be answered by him. During the election campaign, My Step Alliance focused
its campaign around Pashinyan, and their policy proposals were rather unclear.311 Pashinyan
mentioned as his goals to fight against corruption and improve Armenia’s economic situation,
however, it is not clear what Pashinyan’s goals are beyond those two vague statements or how
he will achieve them. In February 2019, Pashinyan’s government adopted a Five-Year Plan that
included goals such as “fighting corruption, overturning the inordinate market share and
commodity-based cartels of the previous oligarchic system, and establishing a more level
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playing field for business. The country is also faced with troubling poverty, with one in three
Armenians living below the official poverty line”.312
Pashinyan’s block holding majority power in the Parliament and Yerevan City Council as
well as Pashinyan being the Commander-in-Chief of the Armenian Military makes it rather hard
to hold him or his government accountable for their actions. Armenia has a long history of oneparty rule -- this was the case during Kocharyan’s and Sargsyan’s presidencies, and Pashinyan’s
term is no different. The Bright Armenia Party and its leader Edmon Marukyan, were initially
part of My Step Alliance, which means that the third opposition party in the Parliament is
ideologically aligned with Pashinyan and hardly challenges him or his proposed legislations.
There are no checks and balances in place that truly hold Pashinyan accountable. Journalists,
that try to keep him in check, face harsh reactions from him and his government, hence
Pashinyan has rather unfavorable relations with the media, especially when the media is critical
of his actions.313
One of the main initial criticisms that Pashinyan was faced with was regarding his
appointments of some of the key political figures. One notable feature that they all share is the
fact that they all are relatively young and inexperienced. For example, Diaspora minister
Mkhitar Hayrapetyan was 27 years old during the time of his appointment, Deputy Prime
Minister Tigran Avinyan and Pashinyan's chief of staff Eduard Aghajanyan were both 29.314 It
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can be argued that Pashinyan’s team is too inexperienced to handle the challenges that
Armenia is facing, especially when it comes to foreign policy and complicated relations
regarding Nagorno Karabakh. Anahit Shirinyan, a Yerevan-based fellow at the British think tank
Chatham House, explained that Pashinyan tends to prefer “loyalty more than bringing in
established professionals, and after the election they will be under more scrutiny”.315 This
analysis can be supported by the fact that almost all the newly appointed ministers and high
ranking officials were with Pashinyan during the Velvet Revolution, some of them marched with
him from Gyumri to Yerevan and had established close relations with him. However, as time
goes by, more and more analysts express disapproval when it comes to Pashinyan’s
appointments. Konstantin Ter-Nakalyan, the editor of the commentary website blognews.am,
said that he is still not unsure whether “[Pashinyan] is good but he has a bad team,” or “both
Pashinyan and his team are a catastrophe and pose a threat to national security”.316 He further
said: “That Nikol's team is a natural disaster is already an axiomatic fact, so I want to believe
that we are dealing with the first option”.317 Others however argue that all the officials under
Sargsyan’s regime were extremely corrupt, so having relatively inexperienced politicians that
hold good values is more important.318 While values that politicians hold are indeed important,
Armenia as a country is in a position that any political mistake can lead to frightful outcomes,
hence having experienced high-ranking officials is as important as the values they hold.
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International Relations
The sphere of foreign relations proves to be the “Achilles heel” of the new Armenian
government, as neither Pashinyan nor his relatively young cabinet has much knowledge or
experience in the sphere.
It is widely assumed that Color Revolutions lead to countries gaining closer ties with
Europe and steering away from Russia. This might have been the case for Georgia and Ukraine,
both of which signed Association Agreements together with a Deep and Comprehensive FreeTrade Area (DCFTA) in 2014, which became effective in 2016 and 2017, respectively. While
neither of those countries are NATO member states, they both actively seek membership. What
about Armenia?

Russia
In 2013, Armenia opted out of signing an Association Agreement with the EU and
instead became a member of the Eurasian Economic Union led by Russia. As Chapter 2 explored
in detail, this decision made by Armenia was not a simple one -- circumstances that Armenia
was put in did not allow the Armenian government to make any other decision. Russia
conducted huge arms deal with Azerbaijan, which was a clear sign to Yerevan that “Russia’s
South Caucasus policy (premised on a strategic alliance with Armenia) could change should
Armenia’s further integration with the EU materialize”.319 Frozen conflict over Nagorno

319

Directorate-General for External Policies. 2017. EU Relations with Armenia and Azerbaijan. European Parliament
Policy Department. Page 5

97

Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan is one of the most prominent and ongoing
challenges that Armenia has to face. Additionally, this conflict actively shapes both internal and
external decisions that Armenia has to make, as “maintaining the conflict status quo and
protecting the Nagorno-Karabakh de facto government”320 is highly important to Armenians
and Armenia. When it comes to Karabakh, there is a certain acceptable language, norms and
single narrative that must be maintained. Armenia’s identity is highly connected to the need to
maintain Nagorno Karabakh’s independence and ethnic Armenian essence as well as keeping
the Lachin Corridor which connects Armenia to Nagorno Karabakh.321 While there is an
argument that strong relations between Armenia and the West “will provide a more
advantageous platform for engagement on the long-running conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh”,322
Armenia is still highly reliant on Russia’s support. Vladimir Zharikhin, deputy director of the
Institute for the Commonwealth of the Independent States, which is part of the Russian
Academy of Sciences, says: “Armenia is in a complicated geopolitical situation, but the bottom
line is that it doesn't have many alternatives …. given that it is locked in [a frozen] war with
Azerbaijan over [the Armenian-populated territory of] Nagorno-Karabakh, and has NATO
member Turkey on its other border, it needs Russia and is not likely to change its geopolitical
position no matter who comes to power”.323
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Signing an Association Agreement together with a Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade
Area with the EU would have affected Armenia’s economy in a much more positive way than
the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) did. EAEU was already highly divided upon Armenia’s
entrance as Kazakhstan and Belarus were frustrated with Russia’s hegemonic policies and tried
to use Armenia’s membership in the EAEU to increase their bargaining power.324 Armenia did
not gain many advantages from joining the Union either. Armenia does not border any of the
member states, and the only member state that Armenia has major trading ties with is Russia,
and even that became more prominent only after joining the Union, as initially Armenia’s
number one trade partner was the European Union.325 In 2018, the European Economic Union
(Russia and the rest of the states) constituted 26 percent of Armenia’s foreign trade, while the
European Union’s share was 25 percent.326 However, when one looks closer to Armenia’s trade
with EAEU states, it is immediately noticeable that Russia is Armenia’s primary trade partner:
“in 2017, a meagre 0.7 percent of Armenia exports went to Belarus, while 0.1 percent went to
Kazakhstan and virtually none of them went to Kyrgyzstan”.327 This once again showcases that
Armenia is highly dependent on Russia when it comes to economic relationships. Additionally,
Western sanctions against Russia and the devaluation of the Ruble made this economic
partnership even more disadvantageous for Armenia.328 Furthermore, in 2020, some initial
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exemptions from the higher EEU tariffs will expire, which will affect around 800 types of
Armenian goods and products.329
It seems like not much has changed in Armenia – Russia relations after Nikol Pashinyan
became the new Prime Minister of Armenia. “During the first year in his new capacity,
Pashinyan had five meetings with the Russian president: on May 14, June 13, September 8, and
December 27 of 2018, as well as on June 6, 2019”.330 Additionally, from November 2018 on, a
multitude of bilateral meetings took place between Armenia and Russia on levels like
“parliamentary commissions, intergovernmental committees, commissions on militarytechnical issues, and discussions between various agencies”.331 In February 2019, Pashinyan’s
government went as far as sending a humanitarian mission to Syria, a suggestion that was
rejected by Serzh Sargsyan earlier.332 The Kremlin has been asking its military allies for years to
support Russia’s mission in Syria, however, Armenia is the first one who took up Russia’s offer.
The Armenian Ministry of Defense put out a statement emphasizing the non-combat nature of
Armenia’s involvement: “The Armenian specialists will carry out humanitarian activities,
connected with demining, anti-mine education, and providing medical assistance in Aleppo,
exclusively outside areas where military activities are being conducted”.333 This has been a
rather unexpected move by the pro-Western cabinet of Pashinyan.
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One of the biggest setbacks that the Kremlin and Yerevan faced was the rise of gas
prices in 2019. Prices went up by 10 percent -- from $150 to $165 per thousand cubic meters.334
This came as a surprise to Armenia as the government was in talks with Russia regarding a
reduction of gas prices since November 2018. After Pashinyan’s and Putin’s meeting in Moscow
on December 27, Garegin Baghramyan, Armenia’s Minister of Energy and Natural Resources
announced: “Of course, we are holding talks on reducing the tariff, but I am unaware of Russia’s
proposals. The best result for us must be to reduce the tariff”.335 Eduard Abrahamyan, a
London-based analyst of Armenia, suggests that this price increase is “symptomatic of how the
Kremlin is exploiting Armenia’s acute dependence on Russian hydrocarbons, using gas supply as
a political instrument to put pressure on the Pashinyan-led government”.336 This once again
showcases that Armenia is not in a bargaining position, as Russian-owned Gazprom is the main
importer of gas. Armenia does import natural gas from Iran in a barter arrangement -- Armenia
exchanges its surplus electricity for gas -- however, the level of Iranian gas imports is
incomparable to Russian -- 500 million cubic meters compared to roughly 2 billion cubic meters
annually.337 Also, Russian gas has better quality. However, gas prices did not increase for the
domestic consumers, as the government “persuaded the Russian-owned gas distribution
network in Armenia to absorb the new cost”.338 Gas prices remained the same for the domestic
consumers in 2020, however on March 31, 2020 information got circulated that Gazprom
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Armenia is planning to start the process of negotiations on July 1, 2020, regarding possible
change in gas prices.339
Russia is Armenia’s number one trading partner; arms, gas and electricity supplier; as
well as the primary destination for Armenian labor migrants, creating rather unequal relations
between Russia and Armenia. Over time, it became noticeable to both the Armenian
government and population that the relationship between the two countries “had become less
of a partnership and decidedly one-sided”.340 Armenia is clearly dependent on Russia; however,
Armenia is also a key state of interest for Russia. Armenia allows Russia to have a strong
foothold and ally in the Caucasus as well as Russia has its military base in Gyumri, Armenia.
Russia highly utilizes Armenia’s unfavorable position in the region as it is clear to Russia that
unlike Ukraine and Georgia, Armenia cannot detach itself from Russia.
European Union
Negotiations on the new Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement (CEPA)
were opened in 2015341, which is an alternative to Association Agreement that Armenia did not
sign in 2013. This was then president Sargsyan’s attempt to restore relations with the European
Union. CEPA is the ‘lighter’ version of an Association Agreement (AA) and Deep and
Comprehensive Free-Trade Area (DCFTA). While DCFTA and AA have distinct political and
economic elements to it, CEPA is mainly political. CEPA was signed in 2017 and was developed
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within the general framework of the Eastern Partnership initiative launched in 2009.342 The
agreement came into force in June 2018, while the CEPA implementation roadmap was
finalized and approved in June 2019.343 Signing CEPA was a significant step for Armenia, given
the previous circumstances and drawbacks that Armenia had with the EU. The key areas of
cooperation based on the agreement are “education, justice reforms, support to SMEs, and
energy efficiency”.344
CEPA is not an economic union, which decreases its power to mainly political
symbolism, however, the agreement might eventually allow Armenia to get closer to the EU.
Based on current relations with the EU, one should not expect increased help regarding security
issues, the Karabakh conflict, or relations with Turkey.345 The Velvet Revolution, from the
European perspective, showcased “a vindication of core European values thanks to the
successful application of non-violent tactics and unusually disciplined and coordinated ‘people
power’ rallies and demonstrations”.346 However, not much has changed in EU-Armenia
relations after Pashinyan became a Prime Minister. The two main initiatives that Armenia and
the EU are working on is the EU-Armenia Aviation agreement and attempts at visa
liberalization.
On November 24, 2017, Armenia and the European Union signed the Common Aviation
Area Agreement.347 It is estimated that this agreement will bring an additional 87,000
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passengers and generate more than €16 million in the first five years.348 This agreement will
guarantee higher connectivity between Armenia and EU member states, lower fares for
travelers as well as will create more jobs and income. As Commissioner for Transport Violeta
Bulc said: "Today we are further delivering on our ambitious aviation strategy by taking our
aviation relations with Armenia to the next level. This agreement will not only improve market
access, it will also contribute to the highest safety, security and environmental standards. This is
good news for European and Armenian travelers and businesses".349 While the agreement was
signed during Sargsyan’s presidency, the benefits of the agreement became evident to the
public after Pashinyan’s cabinet came to power. Armenia obtained agreements with RyanAir
and WizzAir, European low-cost airlines that provide cheap flights to and from Armenia, to
extend their routes to and from many European countries and cities.
Visa liberalization means that Armenian passport holders will be able to travel to
Schengen Zone countries visa-free for 90 days within a 6-month period. Armenia and the EU
signed the Joint Declaration on a Mobility Partnership on October 27, 2011, in Luxemburg,
which was a key step towards developing cooperation in the area of mobility.350 In February
2012, talks on Visa Facilitation and a Readmission Agreement between the EU and Armenia
began. An agreement on the Facilitation of the Issuance of Visas was signed on December 17,
2012, and the Readmission Agreement on April 19, 2013, entering into force on January 1,
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2014.351 While talks are ongoing, Armenia still has to reach a point where its citizens will be able
to access the Schengen Zone with no visa restrictions. Nonetheless, there are high hopes that
Visa Liberalization will be reached either by the end of 2020 or early 2021. Both Ukrainian and
Georgian nationals gained visa-free access to Schengen Zone countries in 2017 and 2016
respectively. Armenia hopes that the Velvet Revolution showcased that Armenia is inclined
towards democracy and European values. According to Pashinyan, lowered numbers of
Armenian asylum seekers in Europe should improve Europe’s trust towards Armenian nationals.
According to official EU statistics “there were 1,815 first-time Armenian asylum applicants in
the EU in the first half of this year, down from 2,475 in the same period of 2018. The number of
such asylum requests stood at 3,250 in the first half of 2017”.352
Pashinyan’s cabinet is also working towards deepening relations with individual EU
states. In October 2017, Yerevan hosted the 17th summit of la Francophonie, which deepened
Armenia’s already strong ties with France.353 In 2018 and 2019 Prime Minister Pashinyan and
Angela Merkel exchanged official visits, which gave new strength to Armenia’s relations with
Germany.354 Pashinyan and Merkel had their third meeting in February 2020. In October 2019,
Armenia and Germany held an economic forum, which according to Angela Merkel “ushered in
a new vector in German-Armenian relations”.355 Germany is interested in creating a corridor
between the Persian Gulf and the Black Sea, which will further develop the region’s and
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Armenia’s economic ties to Europe.356 Markel also mentioned the Nagorno Karabakh conflict,
saying: “High on the agenda of today’s discussion is the settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. We will have to work hard and long in order to have a breakthrough in ArmenianAzerbaijani relations”.357
While it was anticipated by some that after the Velvet Revolution, Armenia will
instantaneously become closer to Europe, that did not happen. The Velvet Revolution did not
get the vocal Western support that the Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution
in Ukraine did. This might be linked to the limited Western engagement in the region in general
and in Armenia in particular. As for the US and EU, “the region is secondary to relations with
Russia, Turkey and Iran, and its issues have largely been a sideshow in the context of the higherprofile policy challenges presented by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan”.358 Additionally,
Azerbaijan is an oil-rich country, which is another factor that European countries have to
consider before backing Armenia in a controversial conflict like Nagorno Karabakh.359 This
creates further skepticism towards the West when it comes to cooperation and security
matters like the conflict in Nagorno Karabakh which makes Armenia lean towards Russia when
it comes to choosing an ally.

356

Azadian, Edmond. 2020. Armenia Emerges from Political Isolation. The Armenian Mirror-Spectator
The Prime Minister of the Republic of Armenia. 2020. “The economic forum of October ushered in a new vector
in Armenian-German relations” - Nikol Pashinyan, Angela Merkel address mass media representatives
358
Shirinyan, Anahit. 2019. Armenia’s Foreign Policy Balancing in an Age of Uncertainty. Chatham House. Page 13
359
Ibid.
357

106

Nagorno Karabakh/Turkey/Azerbaijan
Feasibly there were no improvements in the Karabakh question or relations with
Turkey/Azerbaijan. In September 2018, Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders reached an
agreement to decrease tension on the border and re-establish a military hotline.360 The
agreement was respected until June 2019, when several casualties took place. Nikol Pashinyan
and Ilham Aliyev met in January and March 2019. The two foreign ministers had meetings in
January, April, and June 2019, however, those meetings led to no breakthroughs.361 In the same
manner, peace talks mediated by the Minsk Group of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) proven to be ineffective specifically because neither Armenia nor
Azerbaijan are willing to change their demands.362 The 4-Day War in 2016 between Armenia
and Azerbaijan further deepened Armenians’ nationalistic feelings towards the state and
hardened Armenia’s stance on keeping Karabakh intact. Furthermore, the new Armenian
government argued that the only possible solution for long-lasting peace talks will be returning
the Nagorno Karabakh’s government to the negotiation table.363 Azerbaijan firmly rejected this
suggestion. Pashinyan also made public statements announcing that districts captured from
Azerbaijan in 1993 and 1994 are not up for discussion, while Sargsyan’s government did offer
Azerbaijan the captured zones in return for formal recognition of Nagorno Karabakh.364
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There are also multiple organizations in Armenia whose main goal is to maintain
Karabakh’s de facto status and to ensure that the government is committed to Karabakh’s
independence. The most prominent one is the Yerkrapah Union of Volunteers that was
established by Nagorno Karabakh war veterans. Their mission is “was to keep the war spirit
alive amidst the stalemated conditions and help integrate war veterans into society”.365 In
2016, a group called Sasna Crer (Daredevils of Sassoun), took over a police station and held
some of the police officers hostage. The group was demanding then-president Sargsyan’s
resignation. The group called his stance on the Karabakh question “defeatist” after the Russian
press leaked materials proving that Moscow pressured “the Armenians to make concessions to
come to a peace agreement in Karabakh”.366
Relations with Turkey are stagnant as well and will remain so as long as Armenia
demands recognition of the Armenian Genocide and Nagorno Karabakh. Turkey and Azerbaijan
are long-standing allies, hence Azerbaijan enjoys Turkey’s support in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict. Between 2008 and 2010, Barack Obama’s administration put a lot of pressure on
Turkey to open the border and normalize relations with Armenia, however, this had limited
results and not many advances were made.367 During the same years that the US was pushing
Turkey towards the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, Russia was supportive of that
initiative as well. The Kremlin, however, also backed Azerbaijan when it used its influence in
regional energy relations to pressure Turkey into abandoning the reconciliation.368
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Additionally, one can argue that normalization of relations with Armenia is not one of
Turkey’s top priorities, as their main focus, especially in 2019/2020 is Syria and the Kurds,
relations with the United States as well as Turkey’s ongoing economic downturn.369 It is safe to
say that no improvements can be expected in Armenian-Turkish relations anytime soon.
Iran/Georgia/China
One of the most significant changes in international relations that Pashinyan’s
government is implementing is the creation of closer ties with countries like Iran, Georgia and
China. This is a significant change in Armenia’s foreign policy that has the potential to free
Yerevan from the ongoing Russia-EU dilemma. Additionally, Iran and Georgia are the only two
bordering states with which Armenia has good relations -- those states are key gateways for
Armenia to the ‘outside world’.
Iran has always been strategically important to Armenia, however, Pashinyan’s
government is trying to take Armenia’s partnership with Iran to new heights. In 2019, Pashinyan
had an official visit to Iran, while Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani visited Armenia to take part in
the Supreme Eurasian Economic Council session on October 1. Iran is the only gas supplier to
Armenia besides Russia and Iran expressed an interest in expanding the volume of the ‘Gas-for
Electricity’ program.370 Armenia initiated the construction of a third high-voltage transmission
line that is supposed to be completed in 2020. This would connect the Armenian and Iranian
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power grids which will allow Armenia to triple its electricity supplies to Iran.371 This can possibly
lead to the lessening of Armenia’s dependence on Russian gas, however, both previous and
current Armenian governments mention that Russia’s gas is cheaper. Additionally, it is hard to
imagine that Gazprom will allow any other company to take a lead in supplying Armenia with
gas and possibly lose its monopoly and market dominance. During the 2019 meeting, Nikol
Pashinyan announced that Armenia is ready to be a transit country for Iranian gas, which can
further expand economic ties and cooperation between the two countries.372 Rouhani further
mentioned the possibility of “joint efforts in railway communications, high technologies,
customs, science and tourism”.373 In December 2017, Iran and Armenia established a free-trade
zone in Meghri, a bordering region with Iran, which was supposed to bring together “Iranian,
European, US, EAEU and Chinese businesses to benefit from Armenia’s preferential trade
regimes and links with third parties”.374 Pashinyan and Rouhani discussed the implementation
of Meghri Hydro Power Plant which is supposed to “boost capital investments and trade
turnover via the free trade zones”.375
In 2018, Iran signed an agreement to join a free trade zone with Eurasian Economic
Union countries. Armenia did have a big role in guiding Iran towards this decision as well as it
will serve as an important transit platform for Iran to reach other EAEU countries. The free
trade zone will be in effect for four years and will grant Iran tariff concessions on more than 500
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items.376 This agreement has the potential to further trade between Armenia and Iran, which
will provide Armenia with more diversity in trading partners.
Worsened relations between the United States and Iran can potentially create
complications for Armenia. John Bolton, during his visit to the Caucasus in 2018, suggested
Armenia join the United States in its efforts to isolate Iran.377 It is highly unlikely for Armenia to
accept this suggestion, as worsened relations between those two countries can severely
damage the key national interests of Armenia. On October 1, 2019, during a Pashinyan-Rouhani
meeting, Pashinyan reassured the Iranian President that Armenia will remain committed to
close relations with Iran despite US sanctions against Teheran: “Our position is that our
relations with Iran must be beyond geopolitical influences as much as possible because we are
neighbors and have many common interests and we need to cooperate for many more
centuries and millennia”.378
With strong cultural ties and close geographic proximity, Armenia and Georgia
maintained functional relations throughout the years, however bilateral ties have never been
particularly strong between these two countries. Georgia, like Iran, does have strong strategic
importance to Armenia, as it serves as a gateway for Armenia’s imports and exports and is the
only land route that connects Armenia to Russia.379 Pashinyan demonstrated his interest in
strengthening ties with Georgia by making it his first official visit destination in May 2018.
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During Pashinyan’s visit to Georgia in March 2020, Pashinyan and Georgia’s Prime
Minister Giorgi Gakharia discussed possibilities of expanding trade and economic cooperation,
projects in transport, energy and other sectors, and creating transit potential between the two
countries.380 Georgia and Russia are in the midst of ongoing talks regarding open
communications via Abkhazia and South Ossetia and if those prove to be successful, a planned
Iran-Armenia railway for transporting Iranian gas might become economically viable.381 While
there are no concrete projects in the works between these two countries, a possible
partnership can prove to be beneficial to both sides.
Armenia and China have had friendly relations since the early 2000s, however, ties
between them became stronger in 2017, when China showcased its interest in Armenia in a
symbolic manner by building a new Embassy building in Armenia, which is the second-largest
Chinese Embassy in the post-Soviet area.382 In order to further showcase friendly relations
between the two countries, from January 19, 2020, Armenia and China mutually lifted visa
requirements for the citizens of the two states.383 Since 2012, Chinese aid to Armenia has
totaled $50 million.384 In September 2017, Armenia acquired military aid worth $1.5 million
from the Chinese government.385 Armenian and Chinese diplomats have penned cooperation
agreements for agriculture, energy production, infrastructure development, and even military
assistance.386 Additionally, China is Armenia’s third-largest trade partner after Russia and the
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European Union. The Chinese government pledged to help Armenia with its Covid-19 outbreak
and as recently as April 2020 Armenia received aid from China. There is huge potential for
cooperation between Armenia and China, as it can prove to be beneficial to both sides. China is
increasingly showcasing interest in the region and Armenia can potentially be an ally for China.
As for Armenia, closer ties with China (especially in the military sphere) might be seen as less of
an issue for Russia, which does not see China as threatening to the extent as the West does.

Governmental Actions
One of the first areas that Pashinyan and his government started working on
immediately was corruption, which led to multiple arrests and dismissals. The current
government launched a corruption investigation into government-linked oligarchs, which was
highly supported by Armenians as they were truly tired of all the corruption that was taking
place.387 Transparency International ranked Armenia 105 out of 180 countries in terms of
perceived corruption.388 Armenia’s National Security Service president Artur Vanetsyan on May
19, 2018, only days after being appointed to the position, told journalists that as early as later
in May corruption cases will be uncovered and names will be published.389
One of the first targets of Pashinyan’s new government, when it came to tax invasion,
was Samvel Aleksanyan. Chapter 3 provides an extensive description of all his assets and
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monopolies that he controls. Armenia’s National Security Service claimed that “Samvel
Aleksanyan’s Alex Holding group colluded with the former leadership of the State Revenue
Committee to run a tax scam in the country’s largest food supermarket chain owned by it”.390
The tax evasion was committed through selling hundreds of products in the Yerevan City
Supermarket Chain through 461 small firms that were registered under the names of
Aleksanyan’s employees and their family members.391 According to the Armenian laws, small
businesses (annual turnover of up to $237,000) are exempt from profit and value-added (VAT)
taxes and are only required to pay ‘turnover tax’ that is 2 percent of their revenue.392 The rate
for VAT is set to 20 percent. National Security Service estimated that since the end of 2016,
Aleksanyan managed to escape paying $15 million in VAT payments.393 On August 1, 2018,
State Revenue Committee announced that “the liabilities of the company have been fully
restored”.394
One of the most shocking and loud cases was the arrest of Manvel Grigoryan, who is a
well-known retired army general and former Armenian deputy defense minister.395 He was
arrested on June 16, 2018, by the National Security Service (NSS) at his home in Vagharshapat.
Initially, he was arrested and detained under Article 235 (part 2) of the Criminal Code of the
Republic of Armenia that is ‘Illegal acquisition and possession of firearms and ammunition by a
group of persons’.396 However, only in a matter of few hours, Pashinyan announced via
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Facebook Live that “Manvel Grigoryan's arrest is connected with the suspicion that he has been
involved in embezzlement and stealing of aid for the April war”.397 Grigoryan was accused of
stealing food that has been sent to soldiers during the 4-Day April War to feed the exotic
animals (tigers, bears and ostriches) in his private zoo. Additionally, NSS announced that “a
number of classic and contemporary cars, several motorcycles and snow mobiles, were found”
in addition to “18 antitank rockets, 20 mortars, 21,589 rounds of various caliber ammo, a
variety of explosives, 79 rifles and 39 pistols with factory markings and 12,300 rounds of
ammunition”.398 This created a huge uproar all-over Armenia. Grigoryan’s court case is still
ongoing at the Yerevan Court of General Jurisdiction on the charges of illegal possession and
storage of weapons and ammunition, embezzlement of 101,232,917 AMD, evasion of
1,228,176,342 AMD taxes, misuse of 1,225,003,300 AMD state funds, and the organization of
misappropriation of 37,101,100 AMD worth property accompanied with extortion.399
However, the arrest that became the most explosive one was the one of Armenia’s
second President Robert Kocharyan. Kocharyan was initially arrested on July 28, 2018, and was
charged with responsibility for the March 1, 2008 case for “overthrowing the constitutional
order”.400 2008 protests took place after the presidential elections and those protests were
brutally dispersed on March 1 resulting in 10 deaths (8 protestors and 2 policemen). After two
weeks Kocharyan was discharged due to a court ruling that he had immunity during those
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events.401 After this ruling, the case was sent to the Court of Appeals which on December 7,
2018, decided to re-arrest Kocharyan.402 In addition to his initial charges, in February 2019,
Kocharyan was charged with receiving a bribe of 927 million drams (around $3 million).403 After
that arrest Kocharyan was released on bail on May 18, 2019, however, he was back behind the
bars on September 20, 2019, after Judge Anna Danibekyan denied the appeal for bail for the expresident.404 Kocharyan’s lawyers argued that there is no reason for him to be under the arrest
throughout the whole investigation process as Kocharyan “has never interfered with the case,
and has not evaded participation in the trial or investigation”.405 After the motion has been
denied, Kocharyan’s lawyer Hayk Alumyan announced that Danielyan’s decision was a result of
pressure from Pashinyan’s government.
Kocharyan and Pashinyan are long-standing nemeses. Pashinyan was one of the main
organizers of the 2008 demonstrations which eventually led Pashinyan to being sentenced to
seven years in prison for organizing mass disorders. Kocharyan argues that this ongoing political
trial is a vendetta against him and that the court has been biased against him. 406 Kocharyan also
blames Pashinyan for the events of March 1: “Today’s prime minister is directly responsible for
the March 1, 2008, mass disorders and of course he is trying to rewrite history”.407 Kocharyan’s
trial is still ongoing and it is unclear how it will end.
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Pashinyan’s anti-corruption campaign focused on two distinct issues: tax evasions and
bringing criminal charges against former officials that were connected to March 1, 2018
events.408 However, concerns are growing regarding Pashinyan’s and his cabinet’s motivations
behind those actions as this campaign seem selective and rather politicized. However, Anahit
Shirinyan argues that “the dual campaigns against corrupt businesses and former officials have
been savvy political moves. Pashinyan’s government needs to demonstrate quick results, and
fighting systematic tax avoidance, embezzlement and misuse [of public funds] is one way to do
it”.409 Armenians were indeed satisfied with the anti-corruption campaign, as those oligarchs
and ex-government officials were shamelessly corrupt and it can be argued that they are
responsible for the fact that 30 percent of Armenians live in poverty. Ruben Carranza, who ran
the Reparative Justice Program at the International Center for Transitional Justice, argues that
Pashinyan’s actions are a response to his supporters’ expectations, however, he also believes
that the campaign is not simply an act of revenge.410 Some believe that another goal of
Pashinyan when it comes to the anti-corruption campaign is to attract investments from
abroad. During the Business Summit in St. Petersburg, on July 27, 2018, Pashinyan announced
that due to the campaign “all kinds of obstacles have been eliminated” for foreign investors.411
Some of the positive changes that were experienced under Pashinyan’s government are
the rise of minimum wages and pensions. In November 2019, the minimum wage rose by 23
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percent -- from AMD 55,000 to AMD 68,000 (about $142).412 The change will affect about
57,000 public officers and 130 employees in the private sector.413 Salaries of certain professions
were increased as well: for example, from September 2019, teachers’ salaries rose by 10
percent, however, this increase will not have a major impact as “[teachers’] average salary is
lower than the minimum consumer basket per person”.414 From January 1, 2020, pension’s
increased as well, by a minimum of 10 percent.415 While those increases in salaries and
pensions are helpful and appreciated, people still have a hard time meeting the ends with the
salaries and pensions that people receive in Armenia.
It is important to mention that Pashinyan’s government indeed fulfilled some of its
promises when it comes to the domestic sphere. $105,000,000 has been restored to the budget
as a result of cracking 346 corruption and tax fraud schemes (currently there are 20,361
ongoing criminal cases).416 Tax revenues collected in Armenia’s budget increase by
$1.063.000.000 or 43.6 percent in 2019 compared to 2017.417
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Conclusion

This research presents a comprehensive analysis of the Republic of Armenia before and
after the Velvet Revolution. Events of April 23, 2018, changed the lives of Armenians and
drastically altered the direction the country was heading towards. The rule of the Republican
Party of Armenia was interrupted after 17 years of unlimited power and control.
Pashinyan’s cabinet is young, idealistic, and inexperienced. Armenia is a country that
faces numerous challenges, both on a domestic level and internationally. It is a poverty-ridden
country that lacks natural resources, is landlocked, is in a highly complicated geopolitical
situation, that affects areas like trade, foreign policies, and relations. Domestic improvements,
especially economic ones, are highly connected to external factors, and in the case of Armenia,
those factors are constraints to Armenia’s development.
Nagorno Karabakh is a factor that is impossible to ignore, and that shapes many of the
domestic policies as well as decisions when it comes to international relations. Armenia needs
Russia’s support to continuously protect Karabakh’s borders, as Russia sells arms to Armenia.
However, close ties to Russia does not allow Armenia to follow other countries’ steps that went
through Color Revolutions and create closer ties with the West. The clearest example of this is
when Armenia became part of the Eurasian Economic Union instead of signing the Association
Agreement with the EU. This was not an independent choice made by Armenia -- through series
of direct and indirect warnings, Russia pushed Armenia towards joining the Union.
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European Union, on the other hand, was less enthusiastic and less supportive during the
Velvet Revolution, than it was during other cases of Color Revolutions. The reason for this might
be the general perception of Armenia that the West has -- they see Armenia as a country that is
closely connected with Russia. After the Velvet Revolution, Armenia did receive EU’s approval,
however, most likely ties between Armenia and the EU will remain on similar levels as they
were before the Velvet Revolution.
Armenia should continue to deepen its relations with China, Iran, and Georgia. Having
those countries as allies and partners can potentially diversify Armenia’s market relations and
open it up for new opportunities.
When it comes to domestic changes, Pashinyan’s government did crack on corruption
and tax evasions, and while this deserves praise, those actions did not necessarily improve
people’s living conditions. Poverty and unemployment rates are constant, even after the rise of
salaries and pensions, people have a hard time getting by.
The Velvet Revolution succeeded because people were extremely disappointed in
Armenia’s government and the direction towards which the country was heading. 30 percent
poverty rate, unpunished corruption, artificially high prices because of monopolies in the
market, unemployment -- all of those became reasons behind people’s willingness to go out
and protest. Additionally, people felt lied to by Sargsyan when he broke his promise of not
running for the role of Prime Minister. This thesis argues that as big or small as they may be,
improvements became noticeable right after the Velvet Revolution. To a certain extent, people
have newfound trust in the government and that their voices can be heard. Pashinyan and his
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cabinet are still highly inexperienced and lack the skills that are needed for managing a country
like Armenia, however fully discrediting Pashinyan’s government would be rather naïve.
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